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I. Foreword
The world of constitutionalism has changed dramatically in the recent years.
Democratic transition and globalization are two driving forces behind this profound
change. In the last decade of the twentieth century, many countries struggled to write
new constitutions or to amend their old ones as they underwent transitions from their
communist or authoritarian pasts.1 It remains to be examined further whether and in
1 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992);
JUAN LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION:
SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (1996); ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL
SOCIETY, CONSTITUTIONS AND LEGITIMACY (2000); MARY KALDOR & IVAN VEJVODA EDS.,
DEMOCRATIZATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2002); IAN JEFFRIES, THE COUNTRIES OF THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004).
3what ways these new texts have served their transitions to constitutional democracies.
As we entered into the new millennium, one of the most important constitutional
enterprises that drew a global attention was the constitution-making of the European
Union. The Constitution for Europe, a supranational organization but not a
nation-state, tested our traditional notion that only state can have a constitution.2 In
addition, an increasing number of international human rights treaties is citied or
referred to in many international or national judicial bodies. The
“constitutionalization” of international treaties has recently become a salient
phenomenon that fueled intense debates.3 Faced with these new developments, we
are left to wonder whether, and if so, to what extent and in what ways our traditional
understanding of constitutions and their functions would be altered both conceptually
and practically.
As a matter of fact, many transitional states had experienced a rather different
version of constitutionalism during and after their democratic transitions.4 To
illustrate, few examples of successful new democracies made a brand new
constitution immediately after their transitions had taken place. Instead, some more
contingent or even provincial constitutional arrangements were relied upon in the
initial stages of political transitions.5 Unlike standard stories that the eighteenth
century’s constitutionalism might have, new democracies in East Europe, East Asia,
2 The official name of the European Constitution is “the Treaty of Establishing a Constitution for
Europe”. Whether it is a treaty between nations or a federal constitution between states is a central
debate surrounding the making of the European Constitution. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
3 See discussion infra Parts III.A.2, III.D.2.
4 See discussion infra Part II.
5 See discussion infra Parts II.A.1, II.C.1.
4or Latin America failed to catch any particular constitutional moments and found
themselves engaged in rather prolonged but nevertheless peaceful processes.
Moreover, these transitional constitutional changes often came as part of
political deals negotiated by the former regime and the current reformers. As a result,
dark pasts such as South Africa’s apartheid, Eastern European countries’ communist
rules, or South Korean and Taiwan’s authoritarian regimes were never denied
completely. Rather, in order to move forward, certain legacy continued and even
entrenched as part of political gives and takes.6 The subject of transitional justice
became controversial and difficult to deal with even after transitions.7 The last –but
mostly mentioned– feature of transitional constitutional developments was the salient
role of national high courts or constitutional courts.8 Judges were called upon to step
into highly-contested political controversies and their decisions were either in lieu of
or even supplanted with political solutions. While our traditional understandings of
constitutionalism require constitutional codification precede judicial interpretations,
what happened during democratic transitions was often the other way around.
Responded to initially irresolvable political issues, unconventional judicial solutions
were invented and if acceptable, they might be made into constitutional codifications.9
These new features that occurred in transitional democracies seemed to offer a new
possibility in transitional constitutionalism.10 In a way, what stands at the center of
6 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
7 See generally CARLA HESSE & ROBERT POST EDS., HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS:
GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA (1999) (discussing experiences of various countries in their redressing past
human rights abuses); RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (discussing a great deal of
institutional difficulties in dealing with transitional justice).
8 See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
9 See discussion infra Part II.D.3.
10 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.
J. 2009 (1997) (arguing a transitional perspective in constitutionalism). See also Ulrich K. Preuss, The
5transitional constitutionalism is temporality, in that while traditional constitutionalism
demands a new constitution for a clear break, the recently developed transitional
constitutionalism allows more variants to establish temporal links.11
Even more interestingly, as temporal dimension in constitutionalism is changing,
so is spatial aspect. At about the same time, driven by globalization and its related
complexities, constitutions have expanded their territories and developed beyond
traditional confinements–nation-states. Now we have no problem to honor that a non
nation-state, such as the EU, is writing its own Constitution. We also recognize many
international regimes or regional cooperative frameworks, such as WTO, may
function quasi-constitutionally in many respects.12 Some national constitutions
embrace directly international laws to be part of their laws.13 Many national judicial
bodies refer to international treaties or customary international laws to which their
national political counterparts have not yet agreed.14 Sovereign boundaries with
which nation-states are supposed to establish their constitutions and being bound by
seemed gradually crossed over. Instead, transnational constitutions or
quasi-constitutional arrangements began assuming institutional as well as dialectical
functions within, between, and outside nation-states.15 Transnational
Politics of Constitution Making: Transforming Politics into Constitutions, 13 LAW & POL’Y 107
(1991); Jonathan D. Varat, Reflections on the Establishment of Constitutional Government in Eastern
Europe, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 171 (1992); Arthur J. Jacobson, Transitional Constitutions, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 413-422
(Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994)
11 See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
12 See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
13 For instance, Article 39 of South African Constitution requires courts in interpreting the bill of
rights consider international law. Article 7 of the Hungarian Constitution accepts the generally
recognized principles of international law and requires the domestic legal system in harmony with the
obligations under international law. See also discussion infra Parts III.A.2, III.D.2.
14 See discussion infra Parts III.D.2, IV.A.
15 See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
6constitutionalism, as some started to characterize these recent developments across
national borders, shows a gradually enlarged horizon of modern constitutionalism.
With the rise of transitional and transnational constitutional developments,
however, we must examine whether and if so, to what extent and in what ways it
would alter our understanding of modern constitutionalism? How would modern
constitutional lawyers cope with these new developments? What lessons shall we
learn from these rather distinctive dynamics that began around the turn of the century?
In this article, we attempt to theorize a changing landscape of constitutionalism that
would substantially expand the scope and enrich functions of modern constitutional
law. First, we analyze respective developments of transitional and transnational
constitutionalism by identifying their features, perspectives, functions, and
characteristics. Then we examine to what extent and in what ways the developments
in transitional and transnational constitutionalism pose challenges to our traditional
understanding of modern constitutional laws. Finally, we shall picture a new
constitutional delta thus emerged and try to argue that notwithstanding challenges, the
addition of transitional and transnational constitutionalism to traditional
understandings has expanded the horizon of constitutionalism and created new
opportunities for a coming generation of constitutional lawyers.
II. Transitional Constitutionalism
Traditional constitutionalism views a constitution as the guardian of fundamental
rights through constraining government powers, including limited government,
separation of powers, checks and balances, and judicial review.16 The fundamental
16 See e.g. Louis Henkin, A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influence and Genetic Defects, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 39-53
(Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994); Nevil Johnson, Constitutionalism: Procedural Limits and Political Ends,
7theory behind this classical reading of constitutionalism is a clear distinction between
law and society, and a conviction that it is not the vocation of law or constitution to
stabilize social order and to form political consensus. 17 Instead, a constitution is an
end-result, a codified document of social and political consensus. But constitutional
experiences of the many transitional democracies in East and Central Europe, South
Africa and Asia all demonstrated a trend against this basic assumption.
During democratic transitions, when social consensus disintegrated, transitional
societies drifted away from existing legal and social norms. Faced with the crisis of
breakdown, transitional societies must substitute new agendas for old legalities that
were deeply questioned. Interestingly, in the many transitional states, the agenda of
constitutional reforms –either making a new constitution, revising the old one, writing
a new bill of rights, establishing a new constitutional court, or reinstituting
government system– soon became so dominant as to establish a new platform upon
which political elites of different positions could work together. In constitutional
undertakings, more profound political changes were pushed forward and new social
consensus formed gradually. In other words, in a time of great uncertainty and social
disintegration, constitutional changes were not merely end results of political
transformations. To the contrary, transitional constitutionalism may take up a steering
role and serve as a strong mechanism to help form political consensus and transform
social values.18
in CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND CHANGE IN EUROPE 46-63 (Hesse & Johnson eds.,1995); Michael J.
Klarman, What’s so Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145 (1998).
17 Gavin W. Anderson, Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism, 17 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 31 (2004) (arguing that the rights constitutionalism rests on a view of the autonomy of law that
is not always consistent with other democratic traditions).
18 Ulrich K. Preuss, supra note 10, at 113, 119; DANIEL FRANKLIN & MICHAEL J. BAUN EDS.,
POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 5 (1994).
8Operating this way, constitutional functions during democratic transitions would
shift clearly from constraining government powers to steering reform agendas or even
reconstructing social structures. Transitional constitutionalism works not only as a
foundation for democratizing politics but also creates new institutional possibilities
for further changes in the next steps. In this part, having observed transitional
experiences in the many new democracies in East and Central Europe, South Africa
and Asia, we will identify distinctive features of transitional constitutionalism,
examine its development from diverse perspectives, discuss its particular functions,
and argue for its distinctive characteristics.
A. Features of Transitional Constitutionalism
How is a constitution supposed to function in a rapidly democratizing society?
In a time of profound transition, a society has to cope with the past, deal with the
current, and look forward to the future. Intense conflicts in interests, values, norms,
and priorities abound, and thus any solid, final constitutional solutions may be too far
away to get materialized. Constitutional changes during democratic transitions tend to
be rather transitory and await new consensus to develop. As a result, transitional
constitutionalism presents itself in many significant ways in defiant to traditional
functions of constitutions. We identify three features in the following.
1. Transitory Constitutional Arrangements
With the sudden collapse of the Berlin wall, profound transitions became
possible for the many communist states in East and Central Europe and quickly
spread into other authoritarian states in other parts of the world such as Asia, Latin
America or even South Africa. Some constitutional scholars immediately urged these
9nations grasp the great opportunities with new constitutions. But these forceful calls
for new constitutions were not entirely successful.19
It was true that the majority of nations succeeded with a new text. Some made a
new constitution immediately after democratic transitions took place. Romania, Czech
Republic, the Baltic States, Mongolia, and the Philippines were some of the
examples.20 Others, however, managed to enact a new text in much later time. South
Africa, Poland and Thailand stood as representative cases.21 In contrast to those with
a new text, a number of new democracies chose to keep their old constitutions with
levels of revisions. Hungary, Argentina, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia, among
others, illustrated such a scenario.22 Among them, some such as South Korea revised
their constitution only once, while others such as Hungary and Taiwan undertook
constitutional revisions in a rather incremental fashion. Still, complexities exited in
some situations. For instance, South Africa and Poland made some transitory
19 See Bruce Ackerman, supra note 1, at 46-68 (urging that post-communist democracies make new
constitutions to consolidate political transitions); STANLEY KATZ, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EAST
CENTRAL EUROPE (1993) (arguing the ways that East Central European nations made new constitutions
or constitution amendments or adopted any particular models are dependent upon their respective
traditions and realities). See also VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287-298 (1999).
20 See Rett Ludwikowski, Constitution Making in Former Soviet Dominance, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 155 (1993); Tom Ginsburg, Political Reform in Mongolia, 35 ASIAN SURVEY 459(1995); Juan Linz
& Alfred Stepan, supra note 1, at 293-434 (discussing constitution-making politics in Bulgaria,
Romania, former USSR states, and Baltic states).
21 South Africa adopted a new Constitution in the end of 1996. Poland and Thailand enacted
respectively a new Constitution in 1997. For constitution-making details of South Africa and Poland,
see infra notes 24-25. Regarding the constitution making of Thailand, see Borwornsak Uwanno &
Wayne D. Burns, The Thai Constitution of 1997: Sources and Process, 32 U.B.C. L. REV. 227 (1998).
22 South Korea passed major amendments to the Constitution in 1987, supported by a national
referendum. For details, see Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South
Korea, 22 S. ILL. U. L. J 71 (1997). Hungary enacted major amendments to the 1949 constitution in
1989 and several subsequent revisions were made in 1990, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2001 and 2002.
For the experiences of constitutional changes in post-communist Hungary, see Gabor Haimai, The
Reform of Constitutional Law in Hungary after the Transition, 18 LEGAL. STUD. 188 (1998); Gregory
Tardi, The Democratization of the Hungarian Constitution, 9 MSU-DCL J. INT’L L. 369 (2000).
Similarly, responding to democratization, Taiwan undertook constitution revisions in 1991, 1992,
1994, 1997, 1999, 2000 & 2005. For details, see infra note 26.
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constitutional arrangements –such as major revisions of the old constitution or interim
constitution– before adopting a new constitution. Czech Republic, on the contrary,
proceeded with a new constitution immediately after transition but made subsequent
revisions at later stages.23
One would easily find a transitory feature that commonly existed in transitional
constitutional developments. Instead of immediately making a final formal document,
many transitional states relied upon a number of more contingent or even provincial
constitutional arrangements such as an interim constitution, a series of initial
constitutional amendments or even political statements consented by all political
parties. The Interim Constitution and the earlier “thirty-four principles” in South
Africa,24 “Little Constitution” in Poland,25 and the Additional Articles in Taiwan,26
among others, represented well known cases along the line.
While people in South Africa would have preferred a new constitution to
celebrate a new era immediately after apartheid, they actually had to work for some
time to achieve initial political consensus –such as “thirty-four principles”–, upon
which temporary arrangements and further reforms could be hammered down.
23 See Rett Ludwikowski, supra note 20.
24 Regarding the process of constitution-making in South Africa, see e.g. Christina Murray, A
Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa’s Final Constitution, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
809 (2001); D J Brand, Constitutional Reform- The South African Experience, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 1
(2002).
25 Regarding the constitution-making in Poland, see Symposium, The Constitution of Republic of
Poland, 1997 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1 (1997); Daniel H. Cole, The Struggle for
Constitutionalism in Poland, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (1999).
26 Regarding the developments of constitutional change in Taiwan after democratization, see
Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Constitutional Reform and Democratization in Taiwan: 1945-2000, in TAIWAN’S
MODERNIZATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 47-77 (Peter Chow ed., 2002); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 106-157 (2003) (discussing
Taiwan’s democratization, constitutional change, and especially the role of court during such
processes); WEN-CHEN CHANG, TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM: TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (unpublished JSD Dissertation, 2001)(on file with
author).
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Similarly in Poland, political consensus on constitution making notwithstanding, the
earlier focus of democratic transitions was actually on rather practical issues such as
opening national elections, redistributing political powers, or reinstituting the court. In
Taiwan, additional articles were enacted first so as to allow the reelection of national
assembly that in turn would resume the power to further amend the Constitution.
Transitory arrangements sometimes are imposed from outside. In some more
recent cases, the international community intervened in transitional states through
international peace accords.27 These peace accords were seen as transitory
arrangements that facilitated initial transitional processes to push forward further
peaceful elections, public referendum or constitution making. This strategy was
employed in the recent transition of Palestine, East Timor, followed by the
reconstruction of Iraq.28
In these rapidly democratizing states, transitory or interim constitutional
arrangements were made to facilitate political consensus and push forward further
reforms. Despite a conventional understanding that a constitution must be created at a
revolutionary moment once and for all, these temporary constitutional measures
proved to be quite helpful when final, settled constitutional solutions had not yet
emerged or agreed upon.
27 Kirsti Samuels, Post-Conflict Peace-building and Constitution Making, 6 Chi J. Int’l L, 663 (2006)
(arguing a strong link of post-conflict peace-building efforts to the success of constitution making in
present strategies of the international community); Zaha Hassan, The Palestinian Constitution and the
Geneva Accord: The Prospects for Palestinian Constitutionalism, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 897 (2004)
(discussing the Geneva Accord in the process of Palestinian constitution making and arguing their
potential conflicts).
28 Iraq council asks U.N. to endorse self-rule plan (Nov.25, 2003), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/11/24/sprj.irq.main/index.html; Iraqi Council signs Interim
Constitution (March 8, 2004) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/08/international/middleeast/08CONS.html
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More importantly, many transitional democracies had a written constitution that
was by and large consistent with basic constitutional principles.29 What was needed
at the moment of transition was perhaps just putting an end to the domination of the
communist party, shifting the power from party-chairman to prime minister, changing
electoral rules, strengthening property rights to help transform controlled economy to
private market, or establishing a new constitutional court.30 Several changes into the
old constitution would suffice to do the job. Once made, these initial changes might
serve as a solid foundation for further comprehensive constitutional reforms or even a
new constitution. Notwithstanding this incremental practice, these transitional
democracies may run the risk of losing a constitutional momentum. In fact, after
successful initial changes, a few countries such as Hungary, Poland, South Korea, or
Taiwan felt no pressing need to complete with a new constitution.31 Before Poland
finally made a new Constitution in 1997, many had predicted that the final delivery
would fail.32 Till today, the preamble of the Hungarian Constitution openly states its
determination to make a new Constitution, despite the fact that it had been revised
29 Stanley Katz, supra note 29. Katz argues that it was not of a necessity for a number of East and
Central European democracies to make a new constitution. Hungary and Poland, for example, enjoyed
a better constitutional tradition and benefited from a rather piecemeal approach. Czech Republic and
Slovakia, if not impelled by their separation into two nations, could have also take incremental
methods. See also Venkat Iyer, Restoration Constitutionalism in the South Pacific, 15 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 39 (2006) (arguing that “restoration constitutionalism” provides a smoother and quicker return
to liberal politics than any other modality of transition).
30 Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, supra note 1, at 3-15; Arend Lijphart & Carlos Waisman, Institutional
Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America 6 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, On
property and constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 383-411 (Michel Rosenfeld ed.,1994)(arguing that property rights and
judicial enforcement are critical to democratic transitions and constitutional change for East and
Central European democracies). See also generally STEFAN VIOGT & HANS-JUERGEN WAGENER EDS.,
CONSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND LAW: RECENT EXPERIENCES IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES (2002).
31 Hungary, Taiwan and South Korea have not yet had any new constitutions, while it took Poland
about eight years to complete a new constitution in 1997.
32 Daniel H. Cole, supra note 25. See also Wiktor Osiatynski, The Constitution-Making Process in
Poland, 12 LAW & POL’Y 125 (1991).
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already about eight times. Also, Taiwan remained ambivalent about making a new
constitution after seven rounds of constitutional revision in more than a decade.
2. Unconventional Constitutional Adjudication
Another salient feature of transitional constitutionalism is the emergence of
unconventional constitutional adjudication. It is understood in two ways. First was
widespread establishment of constitutional court with the power of judicial review. 33
The second was unconventional constitutional interpretations rendered by these newly
established or reinstituted courts. As a matter of fact, the last decade witnessed a
record high in the number of constitutional courts created or reinstituted throughout
former communist or authoritarian regimes in East and Central Europe,34 South
33 By far, almost all Eastern European countries have constitutional courts and in Asia, many new
democracies adopted similar institutions. A brief note on the years of the establishment or reinstitution
of constitutional courts is in the following.
Year Newly Established Court Reinstituted Judges Reappointed
1978 Spain
1986 Poland Philippine
1988 South Korea
1990 Hungary
1991 Bulgaria Russia
1992 Romania
1993 Czech Republic
Slovak Republic
1994 South Africa
Slovenia
Moldova
Taiwan
1997 Thailand
Source: Author (the web link of various national constitutional courts available at
http://www.ccrm.rol.md/wwc_en/)
34 See e.g. Matthias Hartwig, The Institutionalization of the Rule of Law: The Establishment of
Constitutional Courts in the Eastern European Countries, 7 AM U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 449,
449-50(1992); Herman Schwartz, The New East European Constitutional Courts, in CONSTITUTION
MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE 163-207 (A.E.Dick Howard ed. 1993); Robert F. Utter & David C.
Lundsgaard, Judicial Review in the New Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Some Thoughts from
A Comparative Perspective, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 559 (1993); Sarah Wright Sheive, Central and Eastern
14
Africa,35 and Asia.36 The discourse of constitutionalism in these transitional societies
was translated into the establishment of constitutional courts and the power of judicial
review.37
Precisely because of the transitory nature we discussed above, what
constitutional provisions originally said was far less important than what was actually
interpreted and affirmed by constitutional courts. With or without expressive textual
grounds, constitutional courts were expected to promptly deliver what was needed in
a time of transition. That might include constitutional principles consistent with
liberal democracies, rights oriented to free market, or redistribution of government
powers agreed by all political players. As a result, courts were invited to yield key
changes in constitutional norms by their interpretations, and sometimes would even
have to step –willingly or unwillingly– into high-profile political controversies.
For instance, without direct and expressive textual grounds, the Hungarian
constitutional court was invited to affirm, if not create, the power of judicial review of
European Constitutional Courts and the Anti-majoritarian Objection to Judicial Review, 26 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1201 (1995).
35 See e.g. Penuell M. Maduna, Judicial Review and Protection of Human Rights under A New
Constitutional Order in South Africa, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 73 (1989); Brice Dickson,
Protecting Human Rights through a Constitutional Court: The Case of South Africa, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 531(1997).
36 See e.g. Tom Ginsburg, supra note 26 (discussing constitutional courts of Taiwan, South Korea and
Mongolia); Kyong Whan Ahn, The Influence of American Constitutionalism on South Korea, 22 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 71 (1997) (arguing that the judicial activism in Korea is to be cherished and encouraged). In
addition, Thailand created a constitutional court in the newly written 1997 Constitution. In April 2002,
Indonesia passed a constitutional amendment to establish a brand-new constitutional court.
37 See RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (discussing the ways that constitutional courts may
assist in the establishment of the rule of law in transitions); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000) (explaining the works of five
constitutional courts, Poland, Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia and affirming the significant
roles these courts play in establishing liberal democracy and constitutionalism).
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administrative actions and right of informational privacy.38 The Polish constitutional
tribunal resorted to a rather abstract principle in rule of law to allow appeals of
administrative actions.39 Short of solid textual grounds, these courts sometimes had to
rely upon international laws or foreign decisions to establish their reasoning as well as
strengthen the legitimacy. The Slovakia constitutional court, for example, referred to
international laws to affirm freedom of expression that was not made clear in her
Constitution.40 The constitutional court of South Africa likewise resorted to
international human rights laws and foreign decisions to abolish death penalty, easing
fears during the transition that any capital punishment would be utilized for
vengeances.41
Unconventional constitutional adjudication also presented in a form of judicial
intervention in transitional politics. Given transitory nature of initial constitutional
arrangements, a great deal of institutional inconsistencies or political conflicts would
inevitably rise and expect to be resolved by neutral arbitrators.42 In a time of
transition, a strong presidency would probably breed an uncompromising judiciary as
a more cooperative and decentralized system still needs judicial mediation.43 That
38 LASZLO SOLYOM & GEORGE BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A NEW DEMOCRACY: THE
HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 139-150, 364-370 (2000) (with a collection of selected decisions
of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Hungary).
39 Herman Schwartz, supra note 37, at 49-74, 66.
40 Id. at 194-225, 215 (citing Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights).
41 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). For analysis of this case, see e.g. Paolo G.
Carozza, “My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human
Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1056-61 (2003).
42 Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 26 (arguing that incremental constitutional reforms generate
inconsistencies awaiting judicial intervention); Gabor Halmai, The Reform of Constitutional Law in
Hungary after the Transition, 154 J. CONS. L. E. & CENT. EUR. 154-67 (1997) (presenting the role of
courts in mediating institutional inconsistencies particularly concerning executive-parliamentary
relationships).
43 Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 794-97 (1997).
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was why many constitutional courts –regardless their various government systems–
were faced with similar cases involved institutional power struggles.44
Especially in times when political costs in steering up transitions ran too high,
political players would prefer judicial resolution to political decision-making.45 For
instance, in the beginning of democratic transitions in Taiwan, political consensus
was made that the notorious tenured representatives from China must step down for a
new congressional reelection to take place. But such political undertaking was at such
extremely high costs that even the ruling Nationalist Party was not in a position to
take a strong hold. In the end, it was the constitutional court that rendered a decision
to demand the retirement of those representatives and even impose a deadline for
national reelection.46
In a significant way, the success of transitional constitutionalism in the last
decade must credit to the many courts and their unconventional decisions. Instead of
people’s revolution or politicians’ great leadership, the expansion of judicial powers
in transitional politics became a persistently dominant feature, which however
44 Herman Schwartz, supra note 37, at 228-31 (arguing that one of the most important constitutional
court activities in East and Central European constitutional courts is allocation of powers, horizontal as
well as vertical).
45 See e.g. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization:
Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 91 (2000) (employing
cost-analysis in arguing causes of recent judicial empowerments); Tom Ginsburg, supra note 26
(arguing an insurance theory by which political branches utilize courts to entrench political interests
and avoid political costs). Lee Epstein, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and
Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2001) (arguing that
political tolerance is the key factor of strong judicial actions).
46 Interpretation No. 261 (1990/6/21). This interpretation has actually facilitated constitutional revision
directed to congressional reform towards full suffrage. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Tom
Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 145-48; Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 26.
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resonated with a rather typical worry of counter-majoritarian difficulty in traditional
constitutionalism.47
3. Quasi-Constitutional Statutes
The third feature of transitional constitutionalism is that constitutional reforms
may take the form of statute in lieu of formal constitutional amendment. This is in
part due to transitory nature of transitional constitutional developments, and in part
due to rather comparable procedures between law-making and constitution-amending
in a number of parliamentary transitional states.48 As we mentioned above, most
transitional democracies had a written constitution that was to a large extent
consistent with liberal constitutional principles. What were needed at the most were
measures directed to tackling with particular transitional issues, which varied from
context to context.
For some, an immediate change of electoral rules, of judicial system, of market
institutions, or of central-local relationship was seen as dominant in the course of
transitions.49 A new constitutional court with strong determination of enforcing
constitutional rights would suffice to symbolize a new beginning. Poland for instance
47 See e.g. Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Negotiations: Political Contexts of Judicial Activism in
Post-Soviet Europe, 18 INT’L SOC 219 (2003) (arguing that “counter-majoritarian difficulty” does not
exist in the context of constitutional courts in new democracies”); Bojan Bugaric, Courts as Policy
Makers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 247, 260 (2001) (discussing anti-democratic
difficulty for advanced and transitional democracies); Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in A
Democracy: What Roles for the Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (2003)(defending a strong role
of court in both advanced and emergent democracies).
48 In a parliamentary system where parliamentary sovereignty is observed, it is often that the
parliament enjoys the power of legislative enactment as well as that of constitutional amendment. The
respective quorum is, however, different: 1/2 for law-making while 2/3 for constitution amending. This
would make constitutional politics undifferentiated from ordinary politics. See Stephen Holmes & Cass
R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revisions in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTIONS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 275-306 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995).
49 Arend Lijphart & Carlos Waisman, supra note 30, at 2-3; RICHARD ROSE ET AL, DEMOCRACY AND
ITS ALTERNATIVES: UNDERSTANDING POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES 9-10 (1998); Stefan Voigt &
Hans-Juergen Wagener, supra note 30.
18
reinstituted a constitutional tribunal long before any constitutional reforms began.50
For others, the priority was to redress transitional justice and to take preventive
measures from any future dominance of communist parties or authoritarian rulers.
Czech Republic for instance denounced the legality of communist party and altered
statute of limitation so as to begin prosecutions of criminal acts committed by former
officials.51 In unified Germany, prosecutions against former East German officials
were allowed, and the constitutionality of which was affirmed by the German
Constitutional Court.52 Still others undertook less revengeful measures while drawing
a line between the past and the future. South Africa tackled with apartheid by
establishing a truth and reconciliation commission long before a new constitution was
made.53 In Taiwan and other countries, individual claims for compensation for past
rights infringements or property takings were allowed by special laws.54
These measures not only directly addressed transitional issues that met particular
needs of respective society but also sent signals of a profound transformation as much
as –if not more so– a new constitution could. Moreover, they would not necessarily
take the form of constitutional amendments. With consensus reached in the
parliament, statues would be delivered at a much speedier fashion and they would be
much easier to amend if problems found later. In a time of profound transition with
50 Herman Schwartz, supra note 37, at 49-52.
51 This was so-called lustration acts, which triggered constitutional review by Polish Constitutional
Tribunal. For the excerpt of the court decision and their relevant discussion, see Vicki Jackson & Mark
Tushnet, supra note 19, at 347-356.
52 For brief discussions of the case, see Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2030-2031; Vicki Jackson &
Mark Tushnet, id. at 347-356.
53 For the establishment and works of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, see
STEINER & ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS
1216-1247 (2nd, 2000).
54 For the discussion of transitional justice in Taiwan, see Naiteh Wu, Transitional without Justice, or
Justice without History: Transitional Justice in Taiwan, 1 TAIWAN J. DEMOCRACY 77-102 (2005)
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political uncertainties, political players would understandably avoid running political
risks too high. The form of quasi-constitutional statues with which groundbreaking
transitional measures could be undertaken was the best choice. In the many
parliamentary transitional states, statute enactment that required a half of
parliamentary vote was not seen as too much weak in democratic legitimacy
compared to constitutional amendment that required a two-third.55 As a matter of
fact, these quasi-constitutional statues were often passed with much higher consensus
that required for constitutional amendments.
B. Diverse Perspectives of Transitional Constitutionalism
In order to provide a theoretical account for the functions of constitution in the
course of transition, we examine major perspectives of political transition and
constitutional change. Each perspective reflects anticipation of a particular role that
constitutionalism would play during political transition.
1. Foundationalism
The first perspective treats constitutional change during transition as a
foundation for a brand-new democratic political order. In this view, the best and
perhaps the only way to complete democratic revolutions is constitution making.56
Making a new constitution not only reap the reward of political revolution but also
consolidate revolutionary efforts with a set of new rules for a new democracy. It is
particularly in the latter sense that this foundationalist view of transitional
55 Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 48.
56 The most well known scholar who advocated this view is Bruce Ackerman. Bruce Ackerman, supra
note 1, at 46-68. See also Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 48 (warning that politics in
East and Central European states had not provided a good condition for constitution-making,
notwithstanding an important and desirable goal); Howard Gillman, From Fundamental Law to
Constitutional Politics--And Back, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185 (1998) (arguing that the concept of the
legalized Constitution and the belief in constitutional perfectionism need not to be abandoned).
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constitutionalism derives its strong normativity. A foundationalist connects
democratic transition with constitutionalism in a moral sense and sees extraordinary
mobilization of the people as establishing solid political legitimacy for the new
regime. A new constitution would thus provide a moral guidance as well as an
integral design of institutions for further progress.
Based upon this view, foundationalists actually reacted to the recent
constitutional developments in transitional democracies with grave concerns. They
worried that transitory constitutional reforms were selective, compromising and
incomplete.57 Worse yet, if not handled properly, they might entrench hatred and
create new problems, thus even undermining any future comprehensive reform to take
place. To them, several Central and European countries such as Hungary or Poland
should have caught the very first constitutional moment during the transition to make
a brand-new Constitution. And precisely because of such failure, they argue that in
these new democracies, a complete, integral new democratic legal order has yet been
in quest.58
It is clear that foundationalism cannot appreciate fully the transitory, informal
and flexible features in the recent transitional developments. While a foundationalist
places the focus on moral substance of transitional constitutionalism, in a time of
profound change, it is often the process and in particular, the priority, instead of the
substance, that would occupy the central debate of developing transitional
constitutionalism.
57 See e.g. Katharina Pistor, The Demand for Constitutional Law, in CONSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND
LAW: RECENT EXPERIENCES IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 67-86 (Stefan Voigt & Hans-Juergen
Wagener eds., 2002) (arguing the importance of constitution and law making in providing workable
institutions for transitional states).
58 See generally JON ELSTER ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES:
REBUILDING THE SHIP AT SEA (1998). 
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2. Reflectionalism
The second perspective views constitutional changes as a tool of consolidating
winner’s will in the flux of transitional politics. Reflectionalism dismisses any moral
ideas in constitutional changes during democratic transition. Instead, it offers
practical, even strategic, explanations.59 In this view, whether or not a new
constitution is made in a time of transition is dependent upon practical political
contingencies. Three scenarios are provided.
First, if a clear winning party –emerging after the first democratic election
during the transition whose power suffices to make a new constitution– stands firm in
transitional politics, it is likely that this party would prefer a new constitution to
entrench its winning position in longer term.60 But in this way, the making of a new
constitution would barely stabilize transitional politics as the losing party would
always try to fight back. This scenario offers a best explanation for constitution
experiences in several transitional states, such as Romania, Mongolia and former
states of Soviet Federation.61 Notwithstanding a new constitution enacted at the
earliest moment, they nevertheless continued to confront a series of serious setbacks
and their transitions have not yet been regarded as complete and successful.
The second scenario often exists in transitional states that undertake major
constitutional revisions or go through with a mixed series of constitutional
59 Most political scientists take this view in explaining democratic transitions. See e.g. Juan Linz &
Alfred Stepan, supra note 1, at 55-65; Arend Lijphart & Carlos Waisman, supra note 30, at 2-3;
GUILLERMO O’DONNEL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE:
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 15-36 (1986); Enrico Colombatto &
Jonathan R. Macey, Path-Dependence, Public Choice, and Transition in Russia: A Bargaining
Approach, 4 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 379 (1995); JOSEP M. COLOMER, STRATEGIC TRANSITIONS:
GAME THEORY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 129-130 (2000).
60 Josep M. Colomer, id.
61 Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, supra note 1, at 55-65.
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amendments and quasi-constitutional statutes. Suppose there is not yet any clear
winning or losing political party, and suppose neither party is sure of whether it has
sufficient powers to push forward a new constitution, it is very likely that major
political parties would try to seek their best interests through political bargains. The
result is often a negotiated pact between past rulers and reformers or a series of
incremental reforms by which major parties play with one another according to their
contingent political influences over a longer period of time.62 The experience of
constitutional reform in South Korea, Taiwan, Hungary, among others, coincides to a
large extent with this view.63
Lastly, some even more manipulative measures would probably be undertaken
when the communist or authoritarian ruling party is still in dominance but faces a
serious danger of losing power very soon. In this scenario, the dominant ruling party
would –surprisingly– agree to adopt several progressive constitutional reforms that
would play veto powers against future ruling parties. A comprehensive bill of right, a
constitutional court with judicial review powers, or even a more decentralized federal
arrangement serves greatly such “negative” functions in future transitional politics.64
In the view of reflectionalism, the recent spread of judicial powers exercised by
62 Josep M. Colomer, supra note 59; Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 26.
63 Tom Ginsburg, supra note 26 (South Korea and Taiwan); Gregory Tardi, supra note 22 (Hungary).
See also Wen-Chen Chang, The Role of Judicial Review in Consolidating Democracies: The Case of
Taiwan, 2 (no.2) ASIA L. REV. 73 (2005)
64 In an institutional view, constitutional designs such as separation of powers, federalism, or judicial
review are seen as vetoing mechanisms against political players. See R. Kent Weaver & Bert A.
Rockman, Assessing the Effects of Institutions, in DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? GOVERNMENT
CAPABILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 1, 31 (1993). For an introduction of institutional
approach, see generally TOM GINSBURG & ROBERT A. KAGAN, INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC LAW:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2005).
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constitutional court displays not any triumph of modern constitutionalism but merely
the result of practical calculations by political parties doomed to losing power.65
All in all, reflectionalism views constitutional developments during transitions
as reflective of power equilibrium among rivalry political powers. Thus, transitional
constitutionalism has little to do with moral foundations but much to do with political
manipulations. In some way, this reflective view speaks certain political realities in
the time of democratic transitions. But it nevertheless ignores –perhaps unjustly–
certain positive functions that constitutional changes may provide in the process of
transition. It is often that rule of game in transitional politics is being searched and
developed as struggles and questions arise. Thus, transitional constitutionalism may
still serve to integrate various political and social agendas –despite potential political
maneuvers– and play directional or managerial roles in the course of transitions.
3. Constructivism
The third perspective sees constitutional change during democratic transition as
a continual and constructive process.66 In this view, constitutional revisions or even a
new constitution made during democratic transitions would never stay unchanged.
Rather, initial constitutional changes would alter subsequent political situations,
65 This account is best advocated by Ran Hirschl. See Ran Hirschl, supra note 45; RAN HIRSCHL,
TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM
(2004). But see Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and New Democracies, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REV. 681 (2004) (arguing that judicial behavior should be explained by factors other than strategic
calculus).
66 See also Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2057-58 (arguing that transitional constitutionalism develops
not all at once but in fits and starts); Jiunn-Rong Yeh, supra note 26 (using Taiwan’s constitutional
reform experience to explain such a constructive view); Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 26 (arguing
political origins of incremental constitutional reforms). See also Arthur Jacobson, Transitional
Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE 413-22 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994) (arguing that transitional constitutions -albeit
embracing principles incompletely- would push forward further progress); ULRICH K. PREUSS,
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS 7, 98 (1995)
(arguing that constitution-making in East and Central Europe was a rather reflexive process that
resolving complex social values and moral conflicts step by step).
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where new demands for constitutional reforms would rise and facilitate another round
of constitutional changes that would again alter political situations where new
changes would be brought about. In short, constructivism holds that constitutional
developments during democratic transitions continuously participates in each stage of
transformation, consolidates consensus of early stages and induces next stages to take
place.67
Seen this way, transitional constitutionalism is neither a normative enterprise nor
merely political manipulations. It reveals both –practical characteristics and
normative–nature.68 In a time of turbulent political transition, while a new
constitution may not be achieved in one shot, it would nevertheless evolve over time.
Initial changes would breed next changes in a rather progressive fashion. In contrast
with traditional understandings in that constitution is taken as a stable, most lasting
form of law, transitional constitutions are often transitory and anticipates further
transformations. It thus entails a sense of instrumentality in its very notion and
functions.69
This practical and constructive perspective of transitional constitutionalism not
only coincided with the experiences of South Africa, but also found its place in
Taiwan’s quiet revolution. In South Africa, the earlier constitutional revisions opened
the first nationwide election, thus a new Congress was formed. This new Congress
then passed an interim Constitution, one chapter of which dictated a comprehensive
process –even including a certification by constitutional court– to make a new
67 Ruti Teitel, id.
68 Id. at 2063-63.
69 Id. But some criticizes this instrumental use of constitution, see e.g. Katharina Pistor, supra note 57,
at 81.
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Constitution.70 Similarly in Taiwan, the first constitutional revision rendered by the
old assembly made possible an island-wide reelection, thus a new Assembly being
formed rendering subsequent constitutional reforms.71
It is true that constructivism recognizes the nature of transitional
constitutionalism as an incremental process that is constructed and at the same time
constructive. But it should not be misunderstood that constructivism precludes any
possibility of putting an end to this process, namely a new constitution, for the better.
Having recognized intrinsic values of a new constitution, however, constructivists are
very practical about time that is needed in such a profound transformation into a
genuine constitutional democracy. Changes in constitutional texts may be comparably
easy to accomplish, but entrenched cultures or ideologies embedded in previous
regimes would not be easy to go away.72 Thus transitional constitutionalism would
inevitably become sensitive to the process –agenda and priority setting in political
transitions. 
C. Functions of Transitional Constitutionalism
In the flux of democratic transition, whether any constitutional or
extra-constitutional approach would prevail is contingent on the credibility of the
existing constitution, the will and vision of political leaders, and even some cultural
elements. Once involved, however, constitutional approach would dictate the process.
70 It was Chapter 5 of the 1994 Interim Constitution of South Africa. See generally Hugh Corder,
South Africa’s Transitional Constitution: Its Design and Implementation, 1996 PUB. L. 291.
71 Jiunn-Rong Yeh, supra note 26; Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 26.
72 See e.g. Daniel H. Cole, The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Poland, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2062
(1999) (showing that Poland's constitutional history demonstrates the culturally and historically
contingent nature of constitution making); Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New
East-Central European Democracies, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2000) (arguing that constitutional
functions and structures are largely influenced by cultural environments in East and Central Europe).
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Even the old regime may present an institutional possibility that allows for next
transformation to happen.
Constitutions during democratic transition are expected to serve functions that
depart from traditional understandings which are primarily on limiting government
powers and protecting fundamental rights. Instead, transitional constitutionalism is
likely to intervene in transitional process such as managing reform agendas or setting
up priority. In the following, we summarize three major functions that constitution
may serve in transitional moments: managing reform agenda, substituting violent
revolution, and facilitating social integration.
1. Management of Reform Agenda
Many new democracies undertook political transitions through formal
constitutional revisions. Of course the dynamics of democratization would not
necessarily rely upon constitutional changes. Constitutional interpretations rendered
by courts and quasi-constitutional statutes enacted by legislatures would also
contribute to the process.73 Through constitutional undertaking, however, democratic
transitions would be synchronized with agenda setting –managed and observed at a
constitutional level. This was precisely what happened in the last wave of
constitutional transitions as witnessed in Hungary, South Africa, Taiwan, Indonesia,
among others.74
In a transitional moment, calls for reform are demanded from all walks of the
society. When reforms are astonishingly complex, agendas must be set. But even
73 Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2057-58.
74 Ruti Teitel, id. at 2060 (South Africa); Jiunn-Rong Yeh, supra note 26 (Taiwan); Gregory Tardi,
supra note 22 (Hungary); Andrew Ellis, The Indonesian Constitutional Transition: Conservatism or
Fundamental Change?, 6 SINGAPORE J INT’L & COMP. L.116 (2002).
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agendas consented to and negotiated by major political parties would be distrusted
and challenged. This is especially true when political trust is weakened during
political turbulence. In order to overcome the crisis of trust, constitution becomes the
central institution capable of managing transitional agendas.75 Once set in the
constitution, reform agendas resume a binding status at a constitutional level. In other
words, political compromises and negotiations become constitutionally entrenched
and transform into normative commitments.
Many reform issues emerge in a time of transition, testing rather fragile political
operations. To prevent a breakdown or a stalemate, one would reasonably choose to
undertake reforms through an incremental way that deals one or two major issues at a
time. For, the decision concerning which issue should be tackled often poses a great
challenge to political parties at a negotiating table. An incremental constitutional
reform that divides issues into series of constitutional revisions would resolve this
dilemma, as decisions between competing issues become a question of timing rather
than a question of all or nothing.76
This constitutionalized form of agenda setting, however, base not upon a well
planned blueprint. Rather, it is through a “muddling through” process without an ex
ante “comprehensive rationality”.77 But we should note that any institution has its
own “institutional capacity”. Once institutions fail to provide sufficient spaces for
75 Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2057-58; Andras Sajo & Andrew Arato, Editor’s Introduction, 13 LAW
& POL’Y 101, 102 (1991). 
76 Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitutional Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
191, 230 (1995) (appraising that the extended method of constitution making allowed South African to
gain time in dealing with fundamentally complex problems).
77 See generally Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959) (suggesting adaptation model of change). But cf. Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human
Scale, 108 YALE L. J. 2279 (1999) (arguing “revolutionary transformation”-mass movement on behalf
of grand ideals- as an alternative model of change).
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agendas at hand to develop, the dynamics of transition may flow out of the existing
available constitutional institutions.78
2. Substitution of Violent Revolution
In a time of profound transition, the relationship between revolutions and
constitutions becomes an enchanting issue. Calls for revolution would run high when
existing institutions fail. The more capable existing institutions deal with transitions,
the less likely democratizing politics would turn revolutionary. In other words, if
undertaken successfully, constitutional reforms would substitute for violent
revolutions.79
In Taiwan for example, while confronting with legitimacy crisis, the people
chose not to overthrow the former regime or declare independence.80 The opposition
instead came to the negotiating table and agreed to undertake constitutional reforms.
Apart from street protests and violent strategies, the opposition decided to take part in
the new round of national election authorized by the existing Constitution whose
legitimacy had been denounced. In so doing, reforms within the existing legal
framework in lieu of violent revolution resumed a central place in transitional politics.
As a consequence, political dialogues or at times some turbulent interactions between
political parties were tailored to the undertaking of constitutional discourses and
preparations for the next round of constitution reforms.  
 
78 This is the “spillover effect” of institutional capacity. See generally Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Institutional
Capacity-building Towards Sustainable Development: Taiwan’s Environmental Protection in the
Climate of Economic Development and Political Liberalization, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 229
(1996).
79 Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2067-69.
80 Jiunn-Rong Yeh, supra note 26; Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 26.
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The reasons for Taiwan –among others– could conduct democratic transitions in
such a relatively quiet manner were complex. But it is beyond question that a series of
constitutional revisions scattered in some ten years provided an institutional capacity
in reform and subsequently avoided violent revolutions. Perhaps costs remained
uncounted. In Taiwan, the former regime was not changed until the presidential
election in 2000 –ten years after democratic transitions had begun–. In other new
democracies, transitional process was criticized as prolonged and former regimes
seemed to come back rather easily.81 Notwithstanding drawbacks, transitional
constitutionalism that presents in ways apart from traditional understandings of
constitutions proves to facilitate transitional processes in peaceful ways rarely seen in
human history.
3. Facilitation of Social Integration
Traditional constitutionalism assigns functions of a constitution to be restraining
government powers and protecting basic rights. It establishes a premise upon a society
where social cohesion is largely maintained and social consensus is achieved through
prevailing social norms and conventions.
In a time of transition, however, social consensus collapses and social norms
become distanced to changing social nexuses alien to existing social and political
systems. The existing regime is on the brink of breakdown, and larger political
reforms, if not revolutions, would be demanded to reconstruct a new political
community. Whether various groups of social and political identities would be willing
81 Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan, supra note 1, at 293-434 (discussing some setbacks for transitions in
Bulgaria, Romania, former USSR states, and Baltic states); Robert Sharlet, Transitional
Constitutionalism: Politics and Law in the Second Russian Republic, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 495 (1996)
(argues that Russia will continue to be an authoritarian state for some time notwithstanding continual
progress of democratization).
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to join political reforms and peacefully (re)negotiate or even (re)construct their shared
values and a new collective political identity becomes a central challenge to
democratic transitions.82 In this process, searching for a new set of shared values and
norms that would bind the society together again becomes imperative. Constitutional
reforms by which a new democratic political order would be established may provide
such a new set of values as well as a broader negotiating space for constructing an
emergent political identity.83 It is in this sense that transitional constitutionalism
provides a function of social integration, which was witnessed in the transitional
experiences in East and Central Europe,84 South Africa,85 Taiwan,86 among others.
In addition, constitutional courts –if seen as a neutral, deliberative institution–
may also help re-establish a rational discourse and rebuild political trust and social
cohesion. Despite rather chaotic transitional politics, constitutional courts may
provide a stabilizing function by way of their groundbreaking decisions with
articulated principles and values.87 In this way, courts may become the center of
82 Ulrich K. Preuss, supra note 10, at 109-113; Andrew Arato, Dilemmas Arising from the Power to
Create Constitutions in Eastern Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND
LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 413-422 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994) (arguing various
model of constitutional making facilitate to various extent the construction of a new political
community); Michel Rosenfeld, Constitution-Making, Identity Building, and Peaceful Transition to
Democracy: Theoretical Reflections Inspired by the Spanish Example, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891 (1998)
(arguing that negotiated changes by which groups of various identities are embraced facilitate
successful construction of a new collective political identity).
83 Ulrich K. Preuss, id. at 113; Michel Rosenfeld, id. at 1917-19.
84 See Michel Rosenfeld, id. (arguing recent constitutional reforms in East and Central Europe,
particularly in Poland and Hungary, followed the Spanish model that was good for (re)negotiation of
political identity).
85 Hugh Corder, supra note 70, at 299-300.
86 Jiunn-Rong Yeh, supra note 78, at 269-70.
87 Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary (Or Why Courts Can Sometimes Be More
Democratic Than Parliaments), in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE (Wojciech Sadurski et al eds., forthcoming) (arguing that courts in transitional democracies
are actually more democratically sensitive); Andras Sajo, Preferred Generations: A Paradox of
Restoration Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 335-351, 350 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994) (arguing judges instead of
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transitional constitutionalism and capable of signaling a great beginning. South
African constitutional court for example, among other courts in successful new
democracies, shouldered successfully such a function and became renowned and
respected worldwide.88
Lastly, transitional constitutionalism may facilitate social integration in quite an
unusual way. For, a living constitution serves as prima facie evidence of a viable
constitutional state. In undertaking constitutional reforms and resorting to
constitutional discourse for political resolutions, constitutional culture is likely to be
materialized, which would in turn construct a constitutional identity as well as
strengthen statehood. Take Taiwan as an example. Because of her rather unique
situation, Taiwan has been handicapped in international proclamation. But the
decade’s democratic transition has established Taiwan as a new democracy in line
with the many others and helped her regain the confidence in participating in the
international community.
In the future, a constitutional identity may replace nation-state –a rather
controversial concept– in transnational collaborations. The European Union with her
Constitution would be capable of dealing with other constitutional democracies in the
world. This is a key link of transitional constitutionalism to transnational
constitutionalism as we shall demonstrate further in the following part.
political founders become key figures in the recent democratic transitions of East and Central Europe).
But, there exists a critical view on judges taking leading roles in democratization and constitutional
change, see Bruce Ackerman, supra note 1, at 109-12.
88 Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2060. See also Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa:
Rights Interpretation and Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 UNI. PENN. J. CONST. L. 205 (1998);
Margaret A. Burnham, Cultivating a Seedling Charter: South Africa’s Court Grows Its Constitution, 3
MICH. J. RACE & L. 29 (1997).
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D. Characteristics of Transitional Constitutionalism: Relativity
If there is one word to catch the spirit of transitional constitutionalism, that must
be relativity. Three sets of relativity are of special notice here: the relativity between
constitution making and constitution amending, between formal and informal
channels, and between constitutional adjudication and constitutional revision.
1. The Relativity between Constitution Making and Constitution
Amending
Traditional constitutional theories view constitution making and amending as
two distinctive routes in constitutional reform.89 In this traditional view, the making
of a new constitution symbolizes a new beginning with a clear break with the past. In
contrast, constitution amendments are made within the existing regime legality. In
terms of process, constitution making is often a result of revolution or other
extra-legal means and involves a pronouncement or reaffirmation of national
sovereignty, followed usually by a public referendum. Constitutional revisions, on the
other hand, would not always involve the change of sovereignty and follows rather
normal constitutional politics. As a result, it is argued that while everything may be
altered in the making of a new constitution, substantive restrictions remain vital in
constitutional amending. For instance, name, national flag or territory of a state,
among other matters critical to state identity must not be altered through constitutional
revisions.
This traditional distinction between constitution making and amending,
however, was crossed over in the recent development of transitional constitutionalism.
89 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON ED., RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTIONS: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (1995); Vicki Jackson & Mark Tushnet, supra note 19, at
260-288.
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As we discuss earlier, the call for new constitutions in the last wave of democratic
transitions was not entirely successful. Some had opted for a new constitution in spite
of insufficient consensus or preparatory works. Mongolia, Romania, the Philippines,
and the Baltic States represented some of typical examples. Others however decided
to live through their transitions in short of a new constitution. They instead made a
major constitutional revision at once or undertook a series of incremental
amendments. South Korea, Hungary, Taiwan, among others, illustrated such
examples.
More importantly, in their constitutional revisions, these new democracies set up
neither substantive nor procedural limits. Take South Korea for example. The 1987
constitutional revision that gave birth to an entirely new government structure with a
new constitutional court was followed by an unprecedented public referendum.90 In
Hungary, the first major constitutional revision of the earlier 1990s altered her name
from People’s Republic of Hungary to Republic of Hungary, suspended the official
privileged status of the communist party, and most importantly, added a long list of
fundamental rights. The provisions added at the time amounted to the size of a new
constitution, but they were done with a single act of constitutional amendment.91
Likewise in Taiwan, more than one third of constitutional provisions were altered in
seven rounds of constitutional revisions in fifteen years.92 Having no new
constitutions, these new democracies have nevertheless operated their new regimes in
entirely new frameworks.
90 Kyong Whan Ahn, supra note 22.
91 Gabor Haimai, supra note 22; Gregory Tardi, supra note 22.
92 Jiunn-Rong Yeh, supra note 26.
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It should also be noted that constitutional revisions may lead making of a new
constitution. In her ten-year transitional period, South Africa employed a strategy of
“constitution making by stages” – amending the Constitution first, making an Interim
Constitution and then creating a new constitution. This process, albeit prolonged,
proved successful in that it avoided excessive political impacts and social costs
generated by once-and-for-all reform.93 The Polish Constitution followed the similar
pattern. Poland promulgated a “Little Constitution” through constitutional revisions
and it did not make new constitution until democratic transition was rather
consolidated. The new constitution was passed in 1997 with incentives of joining the
European Union.94
Having observed constitutional practices in the last wave of democratic
transitions, we argue that the traditional distinction between constitution making and
constitutional revision has become relative. In a time of profound change, all kinds of
institutional possibilities are actually open. Transitional constitutionalism not only
allows more varieties in constitutional changes but also more importantly encourages
much more open process to achieve such key collective decisions.
2. The Relativity between Formal Channel and Informal Channel
The second relativity stands between formal and informal channels in the
undertaking of constitutional transitions. During the course of democratic transitions
in the 1990s, informal mechanisms were utilized as a way to induce and facilitate
further formal reforms. One of the most renowned examples was “Roundtable
93 Andrew Arato, supra note 76, at 230; Christina Murray, supra note 24; D J Brand, supra note 24.
94 See generally Symposium, The Constitution of Republic of Poland, 1997 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW
TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 1 (1997).
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Talk”.95 It was first introduced in Poland, then mimicked by Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, and spread into the many transitional democracies. During these roundtable
talks, critical principles concerning a new constitution or constitutional revisions were
laid down and agreed upon.
This practice, however, was rather inconsistent with what a traditional
constitutional lawyer would expect before such a profound change took place. Based
upon traditional constitutionalism, either a constitutional convention or other similar
formal settings are required for deliberations of constitution making or profound
constitutional changes. Only through formal discussions, their results would become
binding and legitimate. Formality not only counts for validity but also demands
responsibility for decision making and accountability for its consequences. Why, then,
would recent transitions reply so much upon informal mechanisms?
In a time of turbulent transition, both former regime and reformist party face up
great pressures for reform. Neither is likely to loosen its own stands. Yet if that
continues, intense conflicts or political stalemate may appear, running the risk of
regime breakdown. Thus, informal mechanisms are important as a way to ease
political tensions and make peaceful negotiations possible.96
It is precisely due to this informality that important political parties or alliances
are willing to come to the negotiating table to decide on groundbreaking political
changes. In such an informal mechanism, governing powers are rather free from
institutional limits or pressures and thus would be more willing to make compromises
with reformists. Albeit legally nonbinding, these roundtable resolutions bear great
95 See generally JON ELSTER ED., ROUNDTABLE TALKS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF COMMUNISM (1996)
96 Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2068-70; Andrew Arato, supra note 82, at 185-94.
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weight in political trust. Once realized in preliminary transitory measures, they would
earn credibility and even become critical in the follow-up reforms. The thirty-four
principle in the course of South Africa’s constitutional reform was such a best
example.
3. The Relativity between Constitutional Revision and Constitutional
Adjudication
Finally, relativity is found between constitution revision and constitution
adjudication. In democratic transition of the last decade, judicial powers interfered
actively in the process of transition and made a great deal of unconventional
adjudication. A number of constitutional courts such as that of South Africa, of
Hungary, of Taiwan or of South Korea offer great examples.97
This relativity stems, among other things, from the fact that new parliaments
lack the capacity of resolving complex political controversies and thus fail to deliver
promptly constitutional resolutions so desperately needed in a time of turbulent
transitions. In contrast, if supplemented with experiences and credibility, judicial
solutions by constitutional courts or high courts are likely to be faster and effective.
This provides even stronger incentives for political institutions to do away with
high-profiled controversies.98 As a result, judicial resolutions may replace political
decisions and thus the line between constitutional revision and constitutional
adjudication would be crossed.
The other more radical relativity existed in the constitutional transition of South
Africa. Based upon the authorization of the Interim Constitution, the Constitutional
97 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
98 Ran Hirschl, supra note 45; Tom Ginsburg, supra note 26; Lee Epstein, supra note 45.
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Court bore the competence to certify the new Constitution by examining whether it
complied with the thirty-four principles and other basic guidelines of modern
constitutionalism.99 The certification of constitutional court was made into the
process of constitutional reform. As a matter of fact, the South Africa Constitutional
Court did exercise this power and even nullified several provisions in the new
Constitution and sent them back for redrafts.100 Also, the Taiwanese constitutional
court declared constitutional amendments unconstitutional and annulled them
uncompromisingly.101 This unprecedented judicial decision was –rather surprisingly–
observed by political actors who agreed to make new constitutional amendments
according to the judicial ruling.102
Yet the intersection between constitutional revision and adjudication is not
without danger. In fact, in the many new democracies, major decisions rendered by
judges confronted both counter-majoritarian crisis103 and institutional limitations.
After all, constitutional adjudication entails decisions –dealing with single issue– by
unelected judges. Constitutional revisions represent collective
decision-making –tackling complex and multiple issues– by elected representatives.
Judicial solutions may be quick to develop, but political decisions through democratic
deliberations –albeit time-consuming– would be more beneficial to consolidating
democracies in a longer term.
99 Margaret A. Burnham, supra note 88.
100 Id.
101 Interpretation No. 499. For details, see Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 26.
102 Wen-Chen Chang, id.
103 Bojan Bugaric, supra note 47. But see Kim Lane Scheppele, supra note 47.
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III. Transnational Constitutionalism
Besides the development of transitional constitutionalism, the other profound
change in constitutionalism almost happened at the same time. Driven by
globalization and its related complexities, constitutionalism has developed beyond its
traditional confinements–nation-states.104 Today, constitutionalism takes place not
only within nation-states but also above and beyond nation-states, and perhaps even
more importantly, it serves as institutional and dialectical functions at domestic as
well as transnational levels. In the following section, we shall define what we mean
by “transnational constitutionalism”, examine its development from diverse
perspectives, identify its particular functions, and argue for its distinctive
characteristics.
A. Features of Transnational Constitutionalism
How exactly constitutionalism has developed above and beyond national
boarders? Today, many constitutions and quasi-constitutional arrangements have
arisen to serve critical institutional as well as dialectical functions that connected
states and non-states in many traditionally unexpected ways. Three features, as we
identify, are distinctive in understanding this new phenomenon.
1. Transnational Constitutions
First, constitutions have developed beyond nation-states, and perhaps more
importantly, they created a number of creative and unconventional ways to connect
states, their traditional subordinates, even non-state or transnational actors. One of the
104 Bruce Ackerman, supra note 43, at 775-778 (arguing that constitutionalism may develop from
treaty to constitution or vise versa). See generally GAVIN ANDERSON, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFTER
GLOBALIZATION (2005) (arguing that constitutionalism has developed beyond nation-states and
advocating legal pluralism as a solution).
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most important examples is the European Constitution. Notwithstanding a
supranational organization, European Union launched its constitution-making process
beginning this century and has now been in the process of ratification.105
The Constitutional Treaty106 –despite its rather ambiguous terminology– was
crafted carefully in a process more like constitution-making than treaty signing:
drafted in a called Convention, passed by an intergovernmental conference in Rome,
and ratified by at least half of the members with popular referenda. It was not only
deemed as a Constitution but also expected to function like a Constitution:
constructing European citizenship, resolving democratic deficit, providing effective
governance and protecting fundamental rights in the European Union.107 While
organizing principles and enforcing mechanisms are not the same, European
constitutionalism has undeniably stood as a particular form of constitutionalism that
covered from a bill of rights, judicial review, federalism, to separation of powers, and
even some independent commissions or agencies.108
105 For the updates of ratification, see http://europe.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm (last visited
Sep. 30, 2006).
106 The official name is “the Treaty of Establishing a Constitution for Europe”.. 
107 The debate as to whether the European Union needs a Constitution was best presented by Dieter
Grimm and Juergen Habermas. See Dieter Grimm, Does Europe Need a Constitution?, 1 EUR. L. J. 282
(1995) (arguing that while the making of the EU Constitution would not necessarily revolve its
democratic deficit, but it was nevertheless inevitable); Juergen Habermas, Remarks on Dieter Grimm’s
“Does Europe Need a Constitution, 1 EUR. L. J. 303 (1995) (arguing that a constitution-making process
that is democratic and deliberative would construct a new European identity and resolve its democratic
deficit). See also Michael Wilkinson, Who’s Afraid of a European Constitution, 30 EUR. L. REV. 297
(2005) (arguing that while there are some reasonable concerns against European state and constitution,
it is more important to contemplate substitutive approaches); but J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman,
European Constitutionalism and its Discontents, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 354 (1996) (arguing that the
European constitutionalism does not mark the creation of a new legal order but a mutation of old
international law). See generally J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: ”DO THE NEW
CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999); ERIK O.
ERIKSEN & JOHN E. FOSSUM, DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: INTEGRATION THROUGH
DELIBERATION? (2000); LARRY SIEDENTOP, DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE (2001).
108 Wen-Chen Chang, Constructing Federalism: the EU and US Models in Comparison, 35
EURAMERICA 733 (2005) (arguing both the US and EU models -notwithstanding differences- work for
the establishment of a federal constitutional scheme). See also generally KALYPSO NICOLAIDIS &
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2. Transnational Quasi-Constitutional Arrangements
The second –and mores astonishing– feature of transnational constitutionalism is
the presence of quasi-constitutional arrangements at a supranational level. Treaties or
agreements that are regulated by international laws and operate traditionally among
states have begun to present some features of traditional constitutionalism: rights
protection, powers constraint, and judicial review, to name some of the most
important ones.109
The most popular and decisive treaty for global trade –World Trade Organization
and its agreements– has been recently characterized as a world constitution.110 Some
of its important provisions that guarantee free contract, private ownership, and appeal
tribunals established for their enforcement are representative of critical features in
liberal constitutionalism: a bill of negative rights and the institution of judicial
review.111 Similarly, the Charter of United Nations coupled with major UN human
rights treaties, although long being criticized as toothless, has been revitalized and
seen in a very different light –more like an effective constitutional regime that is
binding in a traditional constitutional sense.112
ROBERT HOWSE EDS., THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001). 
109 See Deborah Z. Cass, The Constitutionalization of International Trade Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39
(2001) (arguing the international trade regime has functioned like a constitutional regime mostly in the
function of judicial review); Bardo Fassbender,The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the
International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529. (1997) (arguing that United Nations
Charter has obtained fully characters of a constitution required by modern constitutionalism).
110 Deborah Z. Cass, id. See also Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional
Perspective of WTO law, 3 J. WORLD TRADE 167 (2001) (arguing that the WTO functions like a world
economic constitution). But cf Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Why Constitutionalism Now? Text, Context and the
Historical Contingency of Ideas, 1 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 191 (2005) (arguing that the calls for a
world trade constitution will trigger the very politics that constitutionalism seeks to avoid).
111 Deborah Z. Cass, id.
112 Bardo Fassbender, supra note 109. See also William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights,
the UN Global Compact, and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501 (2001) (arguing that
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Regional agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)113, have already begun to perform recognizable constitutional functions as
trade-related policy-making powers were distributed from the center to peripheries
and a strict line was drawn to preserve private trading areas.114 As international
treaties and agreements obtain constitutional status and exert much stronger powers to
their parties and non-parties alike, customary international laws and certain norms of
transnational moral status have begun to enjoy unprecedented recognition.115
For what reasons and in what ways these international treaties or agreements
would become more like constitutions shall be discussed in the following. For our
present purpose, it is sufficient to take notice that it is a result of a set of complex
intertwinements between supranational and domestic decision-making capacities.116
international human rights treaties and their enforcement mechanism within UN constitute a
comprehensive human rights regime on a global scale); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to
Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society, 20 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 1 (1998) (arguing a constitutionalization of international human rights treaties).
113 The North American Free Trade Agreement is a trade agreement among Canada, the United States,
and Mexico that became effective in January 1, 1994.
114 Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: the WTO, NAFTA, and
International Harmonization of Standard, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823 (2002) (arguing that to the extent
that regional frameworks such as NAFTA are binding, they must be treated as well as operating in
accordance with democratic accountability).
115 Harold Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004); Peter J. Spiro,
Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1999 (2003) (arguing that the
supremacy of constitution should be reexamined in the world as a single community with a shared set
of core values); Joan F. Hartman, 'Unusual' Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983) (arguing that denying
the binding nature of customary international law would be definitely inadequate); Alexander
Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the
Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 91 (2004) (arguing that Congress should make
customary international law applicable in federal courts). But see Ernest A. Young, The Trouble with
Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 527 (2003) (cautioning that a direct recognition of
international treaties may change the decision-making structure on the American constitution); Joan L.
Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization": Lawrence and the Rehnquist
Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1283 (2004) (arguing against the use of foreign and international law by the U.S. courts).
116 See discussion infra Parts III.C.3, III.D.2.
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3. Convergence of National Constitutions
Finally, the third feature of transnational constitutionalism has to do with the
triumph of constitutionalism in the end of the last century. Over two thirds of world
population now lives under constitutional democracy, and a record number of nations
in the last decade wrote or rewrote their constitutions consistent with modern
constitutional principles.117 Most nations –west and east, north and south– created
similar constitutional institutions. Aside from traditional arrangements such as a
comprehensive bill of rights and a loose or strict separation of powers, new
institutions particularly responsible for guarding constitutions such as constitutional
courts, human rights commissions, and independent auditors were among the common
features of this constitutional development.118 Even nations without written
constitution tradition began to enact constitutions or quasi-constitutional statues to
their legal framework, and as a result, common law courts today were no more
different than other courts.119
Precisely because of this global convergence of constitutional governance,
constitutional language and institutions are now easier to understand and work with
117 The report of the “democratic century” by the Freedom House is available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/reports/century.html (last visited Sep. 30, 2006).
118 As a result, comparative constitutionalism has recently become a rising area for research. See
generally Symposium, Contextuality and Universality: Constitutional Borrowings on the Global Stage,
1 UNI. PENN. J. CONST. L. 583 (1999); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional
Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1225 (1999); Paul W Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2677 (2003). Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutionalism in a Global Era, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2570 (2004).
119 Ran Hirschl & Christopher L. Eisgruber, North American Constitutionalism?, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L.
203 (2006) (comparing supreme courts of U.S., Canada, and Mexico and arguing their certain common
features despite different legal systems); Thomas Poole, Back to the future? Unearthing the Theory of
Common Law Constitutionalism, 23 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 435 (2003) (arguing a rise of common law
constitutionalism centered on bills of rights and common law courts). 
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and constitutions have served indispensable platforms upon which nations and their
institutional actors may interact reciprocally with one another.120 Constitutional
norms and practices travel rather easily from one nation to another as constitutional
court judges or human rights commissioners gather and discuss in some corner of the
world121. Even when private entrepreneurs of various nations do business with their
contractual terms, it would be more convenient now for them to read each other’s
constitutions to find out whether their business-related rights would be secured and
enforced. Thus, the success of constitutionalism has unexpectedly created a dialectical
mechanism across nations, which we identified as the third feature –and mostly
dialectic– of transnational constitutionalism.
The above features of transnational constitutionalism do not just function
separately, but they also reinforce one anther in some complex ways. The
convergence of constitutional developments would make it easy for the development
of transnational constitution. The more effective transnational constitutional regimes
are, the more likely traditional international treaties or arrangements would be driven
to strengthen themselves like constitutions, and vise versa.
120 Most important actors are courts as well as sub-national units. See e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1994) (arguing that courts are
talking to one another all over the world); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human
Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004) (using
Montana's adoption of a human dignity clause from Germany as an example to argue that sub-national
entities such as state may also play active roles in transnational constitutional dialogues).
121 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000) (arguing that judges
have been interacting and communicating across borders with ideas exchanged and discussed);
Ann-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L. 191 (2003); Paul Schiff
Berman, Judges as Cosmopolitan Transnational Actors, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 109 (2004)
(arguing that judges think of themselves as cosmopolitan transnational actors and that is the best way to
avoid legal imperialism).
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B. Diverse Perspectives of Transnational Constitutionalism
While relatively new, the rise of transnational constitutionalism has already
invited intense debates on its functions and values. Some celebrate it as the prevalence
of transnational normative legal orders which –as they argue– should have already
happened a century ago when international law was developed as a solid upper level
of domestic constitutional and legal orders.122 Others, however, see this recent
development as a dangerous plot by some ambitious international actors and a huge
threat to traditional constitutionalism.123 These defiant reactions, we argue, are
reflective of diverse perspectives, similar to those we have examined in transitional
constitutionalism. Each shows a distinctive understanding as well as expectations of
constitutional functions that would be played out in an expanded new territory.
1. Foundationalism
Like a foundationalist’s view of transitional constitutionalism as transcending
politics into a high moral normative order, the development of transnational
constitutionalism is seen as a complete establishment of normative order, one that
starts with local ordinances, links to national statutes and completes with transnational
norms that are expected to supersede lower-level norms once in conflicts.124 If local
and national legal orders are seen as the consolidation of turbulent political
transitions, transnational constitutionalism is perceived as the result of a velvet
122 See e.g. Harold Koh, supra note 115; Joan F. Hartman, supra note 115; Alexander Aleinikoff,
supra note 115.
123 See e.g. J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, supra note 107; Ernest A. Young, supra note 115; Joan
L. Larsen, supra note 115.
124 Harold Koh, supra note 115; Harold Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager Lecture, The 2004
Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (arguing that we
should take a transnational perspective in a world of human rights); Vincent J. Samar, Justifying the
Use of International Human Rights Principles in American Constitutional Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing the prevalence of international and comparative law sources based upon the
universal concept of human rights).
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revolution that was led by global moral activists to rescue unfair and fractioned
domestic constitutional orders hijacked by self-interested nation-states.125
In this view, the emergence of transnational constitutionalism is regard as a noble
act that renders a more transcending citizenship to prevent citizens from being
exploited by nation-states and non-state actors. The fact that traditional international
treaties and agreements have functioned like constitutions simply conforms to such a
transnational legal order. And, the convergence of respective constitutional orders is
evident of this integrative legal process.126
2. Reflectionalism
In contrast with the above idealistic picture, a reflectionalist views the
development of transnational constitutionalism as a result of political bargains and
opportunistic calculations by domestic and international actors.127 It is neither more
virtuous nor more evil than gives and takes in domestic democratic transitions.
Why –as a reflectionalist would inquire in a rather pragmatic way– would
domestic decision makers be willing to surrender their decision-making capacities to
outside institutions and transnational actors? Why would they even sign up to any
transnational constitutions or quasi-constitutional arrangements that would in turn
reduce their policy options and perhaps even undermine their own, more immediate
125 Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J. 2347, 2398-2041 (1991); Harold
Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process after September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 337, 339-41 (2004).
126 Id.
127 Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment and International Law (draft on
file with author) (arguing the acceptance of international treaties or customary international law within
domestic legal system is based upon strategic calculations of political actors). For similar views, see
generally GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION: DOMESTIC UNCERTAINTY
AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1997); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human
Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217 (2000). But see
SIMMONS, WHY COMMIT? – EXPLAINING STATE ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
OBLIGATIONS (2002).
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interests? Imagine when any European member state decides to ratify the European
Constitution, it would mean that quite a number of its own policy making areas would
be taken away. And, when any constitutions promise a directly applicable effect of
international treaties, especially human rights treaties, and customary international
law to the domestic context and allow judicial reference to foreign laws in interpreting
constitutions,128 it would mean that their bills of rights are, to a significant degree,
indefinite and may be revised at any time by present and future external decision
makers.129 When any domestic constitutional courts pronounce a direct effect of
international treaties or foreign laws, in so far as their decisions establish binding
precedents, they have removed decision-making capacities of domestic political
branches to a considerable extent.130 Then, we must ask, how come would
transnational constitutionalism be developed and thus far accepted?
The answer, from the perspective of reflectionalism, still, lies largely in the
complex calculations of external and internal political interests. The political gives
and takes may vary from context to context, but mainly include the following
calculations.
First, and quite naturally, the cooperation with transnational legal frameworks
carries with it not only obligations but also benefits. A state that demands more
international resources or accessibility to the global market would be more likely to
cooperate with transnational legal developments, either in the name of trade or human
rights. In contrast, a self-sufficient state with a large internal market would be less
128 Article 39 of the South African Constitution and Article 7 of the Hungarian Constitution are such
examples. See supra note 13.
129 Ernest A. Young, supra note 115.
130 Id.
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likely to be concerned with international cooperation.131 This view makes it more
understandable a rather conservative attitude of the United States towards a
comprehensive transnational legal framework, compared to European powerful states
such as England, Germany or France. It also shows why China has shown a more
aggressive attitude towards international trade cooperation as it produces and sells
more.
The second kind of political calculation is similar to what has been uncovered in
transitional context, namely political calculation of dominant political parties.132 In
other words, if current dominant political parties are unsure whether they would
remain in power, they would be more likely to commit to transnational
constitutionalism –signing up to a transnational legal framework or making
transnational norms directly applicable–. As a result, their rival parties –even if
winning the next election– would be restricted considerably.
Finally, and it is also related to transitional context. New democracies tend to be
more open to transnational legal frameworks and their new constitutions are more
likely to make international laws directly applicable to their domestic contexts.133
This actually contributed quite considerably to the rise of transnational
constitutionalism. In the view of reflectionalism, there are external and internal causes
for this. Externally, new democracies lack international reputation and thus need more
credibility on the international plane.134 Internally, facing rather fragile transitional
131 Tom Ginsburg, supra note 127.
132 Id. See also Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2028-29 (arguing the role of international law in
transitional context).
133 Ruti Teitel, id.
134 Tom Ginsburg, supra note 127.
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circumstances, new dominant political parties need the aide of international
legitimacy to stabilize their domestic governance.135 And, this is why we often see
young democracies stand on a progressive side of transnational constitutionalism
while established democracies tend to be more conservative.
3. Constructivism
The above two views stand in sharp contrast with each other. A foundationalist
would expect the prevalence of transnational constitutionalism and see functions of
transnational constitutions and legal frameworks as virtuous in sustaining a broader
political terrain and protecting a wider array of rights. A reflectionalist, in contrast,
would like to reveal the underlying local political interests while recognizing the rise
of transnational constitutionalism. S/he would not idealize functions of transnational
constitutions or legal frameworks but insist that transnational constitutionalism like
transitional constitutionalism is the product of local and transnational politics.
Here, as in transitional context, neither view presents the entire story. It is true –as
reflectionalism may have it– the development of transnational constitutionalism has to
do largely with domestic and transnational political calculations. But reflectionalism
fails to understand that once domestic political actors surrender their decision-making
capacities to transnational institutions, they leave open a broader space for
transnational constitutionalism to develop and it is likely to be an irreversible process.
Nevertheless, this process would be less likely to be oriented completely by any high
moral idea of absolute global constitutionalism, contrarily to what a foundationalist
would hope for.
135 Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2028-29.
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In the view of constructivism, transnational constitutionalism would proceed as a
process over an extended period of time. Transnational constitutionalism would not be
developed at one shot, neither be victorious all the time as it seems to be expected so.
It would nevertheless evolve over time, proceeding while experimenting and revising
when confronting challenges and setbacks. The recent rise of transnational
constitutional developments is a good start, but there will always be obstacles and
resistances which in turn are not necessarily bad. A constructive process of
transnational constitutionalism would expect perhaps intense and constant interactions
between national and international constitutional frameworks and encourage both to
work with one another.136
C. Functions of Transnational Constitutionalism
Despite diverse views, transnational constitutionalism has risen to become a
central phenomenon in the horizon of constitutional developments. Today we read
more often than ever some front-page news about the development of European
Constitution, WTO ministerial meetings, decisions of European Court of Human
Rights, South Africa Constitutional Court, or human rights developments and
sanctions in all corners of the world. But it is not entirely clear how exactly these
transnational constitutional developments have served us. Would they provide
functions similar to those of traditional constitutionalism, i.e. limiting state powers
136 See also Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of National
Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004) (arguing that recent interactions between international tribunals
and domestic courts could be described as the “dialectical review"); Melissa A. Waters, Justice Scalia
on the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Unidirectional Monologue or
Co-constitutive Dialogue?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149 (2004) (arguing for a co-constitutive
approach to transnational judicial dialogue); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The
Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J.
487 (2005) (arguing that the relationship between international and domestic legal norms is more
properly conceived of as a co-constitutive relationship). 
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and protecting human rights? Or, are they perhaps providing functions more similar to
transitional constitutionalism, more constructive and managerial in the process?
In the following, we summarize three functions that transnational constitutional
developments would provide: management of global market, substitution of absolute
sovereignty, and facilitation of multiple dialogues.
1. Management of Global Market
It is undeniable that the rise of transnational constitutionalism has to do largely
with economic globalization. The attempt of more advanced industrialized nations as
well as fast developing ones to quickly expand the scale of a global market at an
accelerating speed was the most important driving force for the development of
transnational legal cooperation and frameworks.137
To ensure a broadened market to function, basic rules such as free exchange,
market stability, contractual certainty and enforcement, even high respect of private
property and other market-oriented rights must be transplanted from those more
advanced countries to the newly included ones.138 A broader transnational legal
framework and numerous free trade agreements are products precisely responded to
such demands. For example, WTO agreements are intended to ensure and police free
trade rules for the global market. The European Economic Community (EEC) –the
137 See generally Andrew T. Guzman, 2004, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int'l L.J. 303
(2004) (arguing that the WTO may serve the basic legal framework for a globally extended market);
Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets
More Accountable through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477(2001) (arguing a need for
developing global laws as a response to globalizing markets); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Constitutionalism and International Organizations, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 398 (1996) (arguing that
guaranteeing economic freedom, non-discrimination and rule of law extended liberal constitutional
principles to the area of international economic policy-making and transnational economic activities).
138 Maxwell O. Chibundu, Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery, 7
IND. J. GLOBAL. LEG. STUD. 79, 84-91 (1999); Hans-Juergen Wagener, On the Relationship between
State and Economy in Transformation, in CONSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND LAW: RECENT EXPERIENCES
IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES 33-58, 37-40 (Stefan Voigt & Hans-Juergen Wagener eds., 2002)
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predecessor of the EU–, NAFTA, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and other regional cooperative
mechanisms perform exactly the same functions only for smaller regional areas.
Intriguingly enough, transnational rules initially intended to be merely
trade-related basics would often grow into a complex set of rules that looks more and
more like constitutions. The European Union is the best example. Originally as
merely a coal and steel free exchange framework between France and Germany, the
EU whose cooperative functions now extend to so-called three pillars –economic
affairs, foreign and security policy, and criminal justice cooperation– experienced a
series of transformations in its organizational and functional forms.139 During its
course of development, the economic community quickly felt the need to establish a
neutral arbitrator to enforce rules and mediate disagreements and the need to issue
common policies and monitor proper executions. The European Court of Justice, the
European Commission and other institutions were thus created and through their
workings –in particular judicial enforcements and interpretations– gradually
transformed this economic organization into a constitutional or at least
semi-constitutional regime.140 Similar patterns displayed not only in the EU but also
elsewhere.141 The reference to constitutional or quasi-constitutional framework has
even recently been made to the WTO, arguing the way that dispute settlement and
139 Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 108.
140 Id. See also J.H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN
EMPEROR?” & OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999) (arguing that the EU has developed
from a loose framework of economic cooperation to a constitutionalized political organization).
141 The United States, for example. Bruce Ackerman, supra note 43; Wen-Chen Chang, supra note
108. See also Francisco F. Martin, Our Constitution as Federal Treaty: A New Theory of United States
Constitutional Construction Based on an Originalist Understanding for Addressing a New World, 31
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269 (2004) (arguing that the Constitution as a federal treaty must be construed
in the "International Legal Constructionism”).
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appellate bodies read and interpret its own provisions and members’ domestic laws is
making the WTO more and more like a constitution.142
The function of transnational constitutionalism in managing a global market has
not only affected transnational legal cooperation but also led to a wider range of
constitutional convergence that we describe earlier. To illustrate, a broader market
invites transnational legal frameworks as it demands simultaneously these
market-participating nations to provide similar –if not the same– market-oriented
rules and rights. And the compliance with transnational legal frameworks would
facilitate even more national receptions of liberal, market-oriented rights and
constitutional arrangements.143
It should not be surprising that some countries rewrote or revised their
constitutions before or after their entries into the WTO. For example, Thailand
rewrote the Constitution following its entering into the WTO and adopted several
institutional measures to provide a fairer investment environment.144 China, before
her entry application to the WTO was approved, took actions to amend her
Constitution to earn the trust from the world that it would genuinely abide by the rule
of law and show due respects to private property.145 More strikingly, amending the
Constitution –especially ensuring an independent judiciary that is capable of
142 Deborah Z. Cass, supra note 109.
143 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, supra note 137. See also Frank Michelman, Constitutionalism,
Privatization, and the Globalization: Whither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063 (2000).
144 Borwornsak Uwanno & Wayne D. Burns, The Thai Constitution of 1997: Sources and Process, 32
U. B. C. Rev. 227, 243 (1998).
145 Marc Rosenberg, The Chinese Legal System Made Easy: A Survey of the Structure of Government,
Creation of Legislation, and the Justice System under the Constitution and Major Statues of the
People’s Republic of China, 9 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 225, 226-37 (2000).
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maintaining trade-related rights and transaction orders– was one of the demanded
actions by international financial agencies to resolve Indonesia’s economic crisis.146
2. Substitution of Absolute Sovereignty
In the course of modern constitutionalism, sovereignty was first invented as a
great legal concept (or fiction) to help transform monarchical regimes of the
eighteenth century into parliamentary or popular democracies.147 Sovereignty is
constructed as a fictional personality of a nation with an absolute will/power, while a
constitution is a founding legal expression of highest order by such an absolute
will/power. The democratization of the eighteenth century made possible for national
sovereignty to be represented by a monarch, a parliament or a people. Monarchial
constitution-making, parliamentary constitution-making and most importantly,
popular constitution-making became conceptually possible and institutionally
available to modern constitutional development.
As a result, a constitution became strictly associated with a nation-state of
absolute sovereignty. A constitution without a state is never possible.148 This way of
constructing constitutions and sovereign nations, however, has restricted our
imagination of constitutions and actually undermined modern constitutional functions.
It overemphasized the role of state in any constitution-related undertaking and denied
the possibility of constitution-making across national borders. Worse yet, by making
146 By the spring of 2002, the Indonesian Constitution was amended at least three times. See generally
Matthew Draper, Justice as a Building Block of Democracy in Transitional Societies: The Case of
Indonesia, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 391 (2002).
147 Martin Loughlin, Ten Tenets of Sovereignty, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 55-86, 57-59, 73-74
(Neil Walker ed., 2003).
148 But a state without a constitution, without a written constitution to be exact, is nevertheless quite
possible especially in common law traditions. It is however in sharp decrease. VICKI C. JACKSON &
MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 357-370 (1999).
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it nearly impossible any creative substitute for state in transnational cooperation, it
created a state-monopoly situation.149 Consequently, any transnational cooperation
would neither be established nor function well should any state becomes
uncooperative; any human rights abuses that happened in one national border should
free from any external investigation or sanction; and neither would any domestic
institutional arrangements that may substantially affect international market functions
be the business of international community. These resonated very well to the
development of international law ever since World War II.
But the recent rise of transnational constitutionalism has changed all that. First
and foremost, the making of the European Constitution for the first time disconnected
constitutions with nations. A constitution now can be made upon something other
than a nation.150 Secondly, possible transformations of some transnational economic
frameworks into more solid or even quasi-constitutional regimes altered our
traditional understandings that constitution is political, and that only political entities
can make constitutions. Economic or non-economic cooperation could take place in
constitutional frameworks.151
More importantly, the fact that some –and quite important some– of these
transnational constitutions or quasi-constitutional arrangements have now exercised
either directly applicable effects or strong influence upon their participating members
is evident of the gradual erosion of absolute sovereigns. The recent progress of
149 Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law, in SOVEREIGNTY IN
TRANSITION 115-143 (Neil Walker ed., 2003) (arguing that the concept of sovereignty became
state-centered and entailed state equality and sovereign equality after World War II).
150 Neil Walker, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 3-32 (2003)
(arguing a theoretical perspective in that constitutions may rise without sovereigns).
151 Deborah Z. Cass, supra note 109. See also M. P. MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE & THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998).
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international humanitarian laws and the practice of many international war crime
tribunals that handled internal genocide and civil war devastations are another proof.
They stand against the assumption that rights are only ensured by national
constitutions. Rather, in today’s transnational constitutional frameworks,
constitutional rights of one nation may be ensured even more effectively by other
nations or by international legal frameworks without sanctions of this very nation.152
3. Facilitation of Multiple Dialogues
The last –but not the least– function that transnational constitutionalism provides
is the facilitation of multiple dialogues on a global scale. In the past, sovereign nations
dominated international arena, and local opinions would have to be screened and
selected by a series of representation. In most countries, executive branches and their
bureaucracies bore a more active role in representing their people’s opinions
outside.153 Whether or not they would be checked sufficiently with legislative
powers, their democratic legitimacy would be less direct, not to mention high risks
that concerns and opinions of ethnic minorities and disadvantaged groups would be
excluded. As a result, many international treaties, transnational arrangements and
decisions had for a long time been regarded as systematically biased and partial. It
152 One example of domestic laws is the Alien Torts Claims Act of the United States. For further
discussions, see Harold Koh, supra note 125. In addition, an increasing use of international human
rights treaties or customary international laws serves similar purposes. See e.g. Laura Dalton, Stanford
v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of an Emerging Rule of Customary International
Law, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court should take the
international law of fundamental human rights into consideration); Gordon A. Christenson, Customary
International Human Rights Law in Domestic Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225 (1996)
(arguing that courts should use the choice of law analysis and take the global legal order into
consideration).
153 See generally STEINER & ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS (2nd, 2000).
56
was even more so for some localities and disadvantaged groups. The international
regime thus suffered great distrust and democratic deficit.154
But in the age of transnational constitutionalism, the dominance of
states –especially some very powerful states – and their past state monologue would
be dismantled. It has advanced in many different ways. First, the creation of
transnational constitutions, such as the European Constitution, provides more direct
accesses from bottom up and bypasses traditional state bureaucracy. By participating
in transnational politics of larger framework, local groups are now –perhaps
unexpectedly– more empowered to take position against their local or national
governments with the backup of transnational governing agencies or support groups
in other nations.155 Local and transnational politics becomes more complex and
contested as more diverse groups enter into their platform.
Secondly, various simultaneously risen transnational constitutions or
quasi-constitutional frameworks would challenge traditional power balances among
states and make one-state dominance or any institutional monologue difficult156. For
example, while the United States is seen as the most powerful state in the current
international makeup, when it works with the EU or NAFTA, one would find that
154 Id.
155 Marc Landy & Steven M. Teles, Beyond Devolutions: From Subsidiarity to Mutuality, in THE
FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN
UNIOn 413-26 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001)
156 Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact
of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15 (1998) (arguing that consideration of foreign decisions is
increasingly popular for courts throughout the world, and that it is not always courts of most powerful
countries become most powerful in competing judicial dialogues). As a matter of fact, two
constitutional courts, that of Hungary and that of South Africa, became most recognizable in this area.
See e.g. Devika Hovell & George Williams, A Tale of Two Systems: The Use of International Law in
Constitutional Interpretation in Australia and South Africa, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 95 (2005) (arguing
that the Australian courts should engage with international law more closely like South Africa); Duc V.
Trang, Beyond the Historical Justice Debate: The Incorporation of International Law and the Impact
on Constitutional Structures and Rights in Hungary, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1995).
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Italy or Spain in case of the EU and Mexico in case of NAFTA wield the same if not
more powerful influence upon its own interests. This is also true within the same
transnational framework. While Germany, France or Japan may be seen as powerful
states, each would have to come to terms with other less powerful states on an equal
footing in dealing with regional matters.
This political reconfiguration also applies to transnational government institutions
or non-governmental groups. The recently exciting and well documented dialogues
between various courts are one great example among the many.157 Within a
transnational framework, both transnational courts and national courts are competing
with one another for authoritative or suitable interpretations of transnational legal
arrangements. The competing dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the
German Constitution Court regarding directly applicability of EU rules if in conflict
with the German Constitution was evident of this.158 In addition, as more and more
international norms being made applicable to many localities, local and national
courts begin to shoulder noticeable responsibilities for interpreting international laws,
transnational frameworks or even other foreign nations’ domestic laws.159
157 Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, id.;Vicki Jackson, supra note 120; Cherie Booth & Max Du Plessis, Home
Alone? The US Supreme Court and International and Transnational Judicial Learning, 2 EUR. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 127 (2005) (arguing that the US courts should join the vibrant transnational judicial
dialogue to help advance the international legal order); David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions by
Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 297 (2006) (presenting empirical
evidence on the U.S. courts’ citation to foreign courts); Janet K. Levit, A Tale of International Law in
the Heartland: Torres and the Role of State Courts in Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSA J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 163 (2004) (arguing that state courts also play an important role in the transnational
judicial dialogue).
158 For a brief introduction of the struggle between the two courts, see Jenny S. Martinez, Toward an
International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 459 (2003).
159 If one likes to know current interpretive status of, say, the Refugee Convention or International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), perhaps the best interpretive resource to look at is not
the International Court of Justices but the Canadian Supreme Court. For, Canada literally incorporated
Refugee Convention into its national law and its Supreme Court has been very active in referring to
international human rights norms. See Marley S. Weiss, International Treaties and Constitutional Systems
of the United States, Mexico and Canada, 22 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 185 (1998).
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The last –and somehow a bit unnoticeable– dialogue facilitation function that
transnational constitutionalism provides is through the convergence of national
constitutions. Today, the number of constitutional democracies has been on the rise to
an unprecedented level. More and more nations adopt similar institutions and talk
about the same language of human rights, rule of law and judicial review. This has
enabled various nations to collaborate more smoothly either with their constitutional
vocabularies or directly by their constitutional institutions such government agencies
or courts. In the past, the mostly cited or referred constitutions and courts
were –perhaps rightly– the U.S., German, French Constitutions and their respective
high courts or constitutional courts. At present, however, many more national
constitutions are cited or referred to, and they do not always belong to traditional
powerful states. New constitutions and their interpretive courts such as that of South
Africa, Hungary, Poland, South Korea, or Hong Kong are some of the examples.160
Students of comparative constitutionalism are fortunate to have more diversified and
democratized sources for their digestion.
D. Characteristics of Transnational Constitutionalism: Relativity
The age of transnational constitutionalism presents a similar spirit –while in
different ways– in comparison with transitional constitutionalism: relativity. Three
sets of relativity are particularly illustrated: the relativity between nation states and
partial units, the relativity between external and internal norms, and finally, the
relativity between public domains and private spheres.
160 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
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1. The Relativity between Nation States and Partial Units
The first noticeable relativity results from the erosion of state dominance in the
course of transnational constitutionalism. Scholars of globalization have long warned
that globalization might lead to the dismantlement of nation-state.161 The
development of transnational constitutions or quasi-constitutional arrangements
taught us, however, that states would not be dismantled as they were still key players
within these regimes. Nevertheless, as we explained in the above section,
transnational constitutionalism has at least unexpectedly led to political
reconfiguration of states and their local units in their more complex relationship with
transnational frameworks and with each other.
With the aide of transnational cooperation, the relationship of nation states and
their units would be made into more dynamic, thus changing their original federalism
without any legal or constitutional amendments. Similarly, the more power and direct
representation being made for aboriginal and disadvantaged groups in these
transnational frameworks, the more independent and autonomous they would become
in their own nations.
2. The Relativity between External and Internal Norms/Institutions
The second –and perhaps mostly important and noticeable– set of relativity is the
one between external and international norms/institutions. Notwithstanding being
“external”, transnational constitutions and quasi-constitutional arrangements are
directly applicable to affected nations and individuals, making them more and more
161 See generally JEAN-MARIE GUEHENNO, THE END OF NATION-STATE (1993); Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
From Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 379 (2001); Charles Fried,
Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalization, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1091 (2000) (arguing that
the combination of privatization and globalization impacts the ability of a nation to control). 
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like a part (even highest) of internal norms. The EU Constitution and laws and their
relationship to internal legal systems of member states provide a great example.
More importantly, as a part of transnational constitutionalism features, an
increasing number of international treaties are now being made directly applicable to
or at least held a strong influence upon domestic contexts.162 The boundary between
international and national laws has been crossed and become blurred. In a great deal
of cases, international laws may be more decisive than any domestic constitutional
provisions or legislative enactments.163 But there exists an intricate relationship
between international and national laws. Bear in mind that it is often through domestic
constitutional provisions or judicial interpretations that certain international treaties
are made directly applicable to domestic contexts. Here, internal laws actually assume
a function of enabling international laws into domestic context, thus diminishing
legitimacy problems of external norms. In this way, we may say, national and
international laws are mutually empowering each other.164
As the boundary between international and national norms is becomes blurred, so
is that of international and national institutions. Imagine any regional or international
courts –such as European Court of Human Rights– rule that a national law is in
162 See discussion supra Parts III.A.2, III.C.3.
163 See e.g. Joan F. Hartman, 'Unusual' Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983); Laura Dalton,
Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of an Emerging Rule of Customary
International Law, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161 (1990); Paolo G. Carozza, "My Friend is a Stranger":
The Death Penalty and the Global IUS Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2003);
Daniel Smith, Continental Drift: The European Court of Human Rights and the Abolition of
Anti-Sodomy Laws in Lawrence V. Texas, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1799 (2004); Rex D. Glensy, Which
Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J.
INT'L L. 357 (2005).
164 Robert B. Ahdieh, supra note 136; Melissa A. Waters, supra note 136. See also David Fontana, The
Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law Scholarship: A Reply to Professor
Tushnet, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 445 (2004) (arguing that domestic and foreign legal systems should be
integrated in the optimal manner). But cf. Jenny S. Martinez, supra note 159.
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conflict with international laws or human rights treaties and thus international norms
should prevail, the way that courts interpret and apply these various norms are no
different from any domestic high courts or constitutional courts.165 By the same
token, when any domestic courts refer to transnational constitutions or international
laws as decisive in cases before them, their acts and interpretations of international
laws are no less authoritative and no different from that of international tribunals.
3. The Relativity between Public Domain and Private Sphere
Finally, the relativity is also found between public domains and private spheres.
With strong influence of globalization –especially economic globalization–, the
expansion of private sphere and the dominance of private actors like transnational
private corporations have been anticipated. While this prediction is not entirely
incorrect, the reality has nevertheless become much more complex.166
In fact, precisely because a larger space for freer transactions driven by economic
globalization was now made available, it was soon tainted with all kinds of ambitious
private actors from all walks of the world, thus generating almost simultaneously the
great need of orderly cooperation and administrative governance.167 A freer
globalized space thus still requires –if not stronger– global law rather than no law.
The development of WTO and its rules that have grown into a large legal
complex are such lessons. While it indicates a larger “private” space to be left for free
165 Robert B. Ahdieh, id.
166 Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private
Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769(1998) (arguing a changed
-but not disappeared- line between public and private spaces still in need of public intervention).
167 Id.
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private transaction, the WTO itself involves a complex system of exercising public
power. A reference was even made to it as an economic constitution for the world.168
IV. Changing Landscape of Modern Constitutionalism
To what extent would the recent rise of transitional and transnational
constitutionalism alter our understanding of modern constitutionalism? How would
modern constitutional lawyers cope with this new development? What lesson we have
learned after the study of these rather distinctive dynamics that began around the turn
of the century?
In this section, we would examine in what ways and to what extent the
developments in transitional and transnational constitutionalism pose challenges to
our traditional understanding of modern constitutionalism. Next, we shall try to
picture a changing landscape of constitutionalism and argue that notwithstanding
challenges, the addition of transitional and transnational constitutionalism into the
traditional understanding has actually expanded the horizon of constitutionalism into a
new delta and created new opportunities for a new generation of constitutional
lawyers.
A. Challenges to Traditional Constitutionalism
The recent development of transitional and transnational constitutionalism has not
come without suspicions. Some worry that these new constitutional enterprises would
circumvent some great virtues of traditional constitutionalism, calling them deviants
168 Deborah Z. Cass, supra note 109.
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or troubles.169 Indeed, the relative nature of both developments is a clear indicator of
departure. But would some departures necessarily become threats or dangers?
Others, however, hold a contrasting view. They appreciate the ways that
transitional constitutionalism has invented new solutions to unusual and difficult
problems posed by recent transformations of new democracies, and that transnational
constitutionalism has made an unprecedented progress in human history to call for
constitutions on a transnational scale and found a creative, and significant, way to
protect human rights without territorial constraints.170 Facing these very different
positions, how could one decide on any side? We think that before we decide, we
must examine challenges posed by the two new developments in constitutionalism
and see whether and how they may possibly reconcile with traditional understandings.
Among the many challenges, we identify three most critical ones: accountability,
democratic deficit and rule of law.
1. Accountability
The first salient challenge posed by transitional and transnational
constitutionalism is their inability to ensure accountability. Traditional teachings in
modern constitutionalism require, and rightly so, that any decisions must be made
with a clear understanding of accountability. Decision makers must be held
accountable to what s/he decides, and only with this clear understanding in mind, they
would be less likely to abuse their power in their decision making. But both
169 Ernest A. Young, supra note 115; Joan L. Larsen, supra note 115. In addition, there may be
unexpected aversions. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The
Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence through Negative Models, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 296
(2003) (arguing that negative rejection, rather than positive acceptance, plays a major role in the
transnational exchanges).
170 See e.g. Harold Koh, supra note 115; Joan F. Hartman, supra note 115; Alexander Aleinikoff,
supra note 115.
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transitional and transnational constitutionalism, showed a considerable departure to
this requirement.
In transitional constitutionalism, accountability issues are two-fold. First is from
judicial substitute for political decision-making.171 In transitional states, many
constitutional courts wielded strong powers to provide unusual solutions to
constitutional struggles with which political players failed to tackle. For example, the
South Africa Constitutional Court was granted the power to review a new constitution
before promulgation, making judicial decision being part of constitutional making
process that was supposed to be political in nature. Other constitutional courts
rendered decisions that became part of constitutional solutions without later being
codified into formal constitutional amendments. These decisions which were political
in nature were made by courts that shouldered no direct and immediate accountability.
“Juristocracy” –as termed by one scholar– caught vividly this problem of transitional
constitutionalism.172
The second accountability problem rises from informal channels during transition.
As we have learned, some great solutions in democratic transitions were actually
made through informal channels, and later –fortunately enough– all political players
actually abided by them and further codified them into legal or constitutional
forms.173 But this was against the conventional wisdom of accountability. In fact,
through these informal channels, decision-makers were actually intended to be free
171 See discussion supra Parts II.A.2, II.D.4.
172 See generally Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism (2004).
173 See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
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from formal accountability as an incentive to increase their possibility of making
deals and reaching compromises. Could any forms of accountability be assured here?
Similarly, in transnational constitutionalism, the issue of accountability also
rises.174 One of the salient features in transnational constitutionalism is that
international treaties or agreements –regardless of being signed or acceded or being
incorporated or transformed– are more often than ever being made directly applicable
to domestic contexts. This however poses two problems concerning accountability:
one is at an international level and the other domestic. At an international level, when
these treaties or agreements were made, their participating members had no idea that
these legal documents would have such far-reaching effects and could not take these
domestic circumstances into account. As a result, there would be no way to ensure
accountability at this international level. In the domestic context, international treaties
or informal norms to which a nation had not signed up are often being made
applicable by judicial decisions. Here, similar to the transitional context,
accountability would be rather difficult to be assured.
Are there any ways to reconcile accountability issue posed by either transitional
or transnational constitutionalism? We think there may be some. One of the most
important is perhaps to open up new understanding of accountability and make it
more broadened. If one looked closely, one would find that certain new forms of
accountability were invented particularly in transitional constitutionalism. While
critical decisions were made through informal channels, they were not being made
without any watch. In fact, during such a high tide of profound transitions, public
174 Ernest A. Young, supra note 115, at 533-38.
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scrutiny –both domestic and international175– was in high alert. Political players knew
greater accountability they would have to bear –even though not in a traditional form–
when they decided whether or not to make a compromise.
As for the accountability problems drawn by “juristocracy”, a common solution
now is to limit the tenure of these constitutional courts justices and to make their
appointment process more deliberative.176 Lastly, one possible way to make the
workings of international treaties or organizations more accountable is to create
potential checks and balances or even international constituencies. A more vibrant
global civil society formed by transnational non-governmental organizations, private
corporations or globalized citizens may shoulder such important functions more
routinely in a new rising transnational constitutionalist society.177
2. Democratic deficit
The second, and perhaps the most severe, problem that the new developments
have suffered is democratic deficit. The democratic thesis of traditional
constitutionalism requires that all decisions and norms must be made and generated
with sufficient democratic legitimacy. But this may not be fulfilled in both transitional
and transnational constitutionalism.
In democratic transitions, in order to make further democratic transitions possible,
many constitution revisions were done with great compromises with old regimes, and
some were even done directly by old guards like Poland, Hungary or Taiwan. These
175 Jon Elster, supra note 95.
176 KATE MALLESON & PETER H. RUSSELL, APPOINTING JUDGES IN THE AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE FROM AROUND THE WORLD 1-10 (2006)
177 See generally Mary H. Kaldor, The Origins of the Concept of Global Civil Society, 9 Transnat'l L.
& Contemp. Probs. 475(1999); MARY H. KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: AN ANSWER TO WAR
(2003); JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? (2003).
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initial constitutional revisions or political compromises suffered greatly in democratic
legitimacy. In addition, when critical constitutional solutions were done by courts
instead of by political players, they also rendered democratic legitimacy into a deficit.
And this has been identified by scholars as a countermajoritarian difficulty that was
widespread in almost all transitional democracies.178
Likewise, in the course of transnational constitutionalism, democratic deficit has
been diagnosed as the most serious problem that threatened to undermine the entire
enterprise of modern constitutionalism. For example, a considerable body of literature
existed to discuss the democratic deficit problems of the European Union and its new
Constitution. Some of great minds in our times stood in this line.179 And the direct
applicability of international laws or customary international laws has exacerbated
this democratic deficit question even further.180 Democratic legitimacy suffers to a
greatest extent when affected parties have no access to influence norms-generating
process. Worse yet, in this way, domestic democratic decision-making mechanisms
such as separation of powers or even federalism are likely to be undermined as they
would be trumped too easily.181
178 Bojan Bugaric, supra note 47. But see Kim Lane Scheppele, supra note 47.
179 See e.g. Dieter Grimm, supra note 107; Juergen Habermas, supra note 107.
180 Ernest A. Young, supra note 115, at 533-41; Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the
Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989 (2004) (arguing
that the application of foreign law conflicts with the traditional concepts of popular sovereignty). But
see Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2006) (arguing that the
democracy deficit critique fails to see that international law is an accepted instrument for U.S.
Constitution ).
181 Ernest A. Young, id. See also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1999) (arguing that
the canon is best viewed as a device to preserve a proper separation of federal powers); Duc V. Trang,
Beyond the Historical Justice Debate: The Incorporation of International Law and the Impact on
Constitutional Structures and Rights in Hungary, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1995) (arguing that the
Hungarian Constitutional Court incompulsorily imposed constraints on other branches based on
international law).
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We recognize that democratic deficit was indeed a greatest challenge to
transitional and, especially, transnational constitutionalism. But, again, are there any
ways to at least improve the situation? Are there any new ways of constructing or
understanding democratic legitimacy? Some scholars have already argued that the
recent democratic deficit debate must be tackled by a brand-new understanding of
democratic legitimacy. And there existed some practices. Take the
constitution-making process of the EU as an example. In order to ameliorate
democratic deficit problems, the EU’s constitution decision makers decided from the
start to proceed with a more open and deliberative constitution-making process by
European citizens. Because of this European (re)invention, a revival of the discourse
on deliberative democracy or democratic deliberation has now existed for some time,
and it has inspired many to envision some new forms of democratic legitimacy even
on a transnational scale.182
3. Rule of law
The last but not the least challenge posed by new developments concerns rule of
law. In the development of constitutionalism, rule of law was within the first
developed group of concepts standing against potential power abuses of monarchies
or bureaucracies. Rule of law –while not entirely uncontested– entails at least the
following principles: power exercise according to law, power exercise checked with
judicial review, legal certainty and legal clarity.183 These fundamental principles of
rule of law, especially legal certainty and legal clarity, however, have been
undermined to some extent in both transitional and transnational constitutionalism.
182 Many opt for more deliberative, dialectic, pluralistic forms of democratic legitimacies. See e.g.
Juergen Habermas, supra note 107; Hans Lindahl, Sovereignty and Representation in the European
Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 87-114, 101-112 (Neil Walker ed., 2003).
183 BARRY M. HAGER, THE RULE OF LAW: A LEXICON FOR POLICY MAKERS 19-35 (1999).
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In transitional democracies, one of the most contested issues was how to deal with
the past regime.184 Some decided to respect for legal certainty, thus leaving past
wrongdoings go unpunished and unjust laws remained the same. Others, however,
decided to deal with the past upfront, thus revoking unjust laws and beginning
punishing wrongdoings that were completely legal in the old regimes. This
undertaking undoubtedly generated a grave concern of legal certainty, and many
constitutional courts were involved and compelled to decide this highly contested
dilemma even today.
The development of transnational constitutionalism confronted similar challenges
in rule of law. One of the most significant is legal clarity. Because an increasing
number of international norms or practices may be directly applicable to domestic
contexts, it would be difficult for affected parties to know exact rules and laws ex
ante. The principle of rule of law especially legal certainty would then become
fragile.185
Fortunately, however, the main challenges posed by transitional and transnational
constitutionalism in rule of law are not concerned with fundamentals but could be
characterized as weakness. Many believe this weakness may be supplemented by the
strengthening of other aspects of rule of law such as judicial review and of
constitutional principles. This may be seen in some of recent decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court citing international human rights treaties or humanitarian laws that
were not part of applicable laws in those cases.186 Recognizing potential attacks on
the aspect of rule of law, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered great efforts in providing
184 Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2049-51.
185 Ernest A. Young, supra note 115, at 533-38.
186 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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lengthy and thoughtful opinions with articulated constitutional principles. In so doing,
the weakness in rule of law may be ameliorated.
B. Extended Delta of Constitutionalism
The development of constitutionalism in transitional and transnational
dimensions poses great challenges to our traditional ideas of constitutionalism. Would
modern constitutionalism that we have blessed for centuries be superseded by recent
developments? With the rise of two new fronts, in what ways could we preserve
values and spirits we have honored since American and French revolutions while at
the same time embrace the more recent innovation? The development of two new
fronts, in our opinion, has enriched modern constitutionalism in time and space
dimensions, forming a new delta in our constitutional horizon. The time and space
expansion in the delta formation has provided an opportunity to digest these perhaps
incompatible concerns.
1. The Formation of Constitutional Delta187
The core concept of the change in constitutionalism as illustrated above is
extension, but not replacement. By the same token, the process of development is
more like an evolution than a revolution. The conventional view in that a constitution
is expected to restrain government powers and to protect fundamental rights would
continue to be honored even in transitional or transnational context. However, with
187 A delta is a triangular shaped landform, where the mouth of a river flows into an ocean, sea, desert
or lake, building outwards (as a deltaic deposit) from sediment carried by the river and deposited as the
water current is dissipated. A deposit at the mouth of a river is usually triangular in shape. The
triangular shape and great width at the base are due to blocking of the river mouth by silt, with
resulting continual formation of distributaries at angles to the original course. Herodotus, the great
historian, used this term for the Nile river delta because the sediment deposit at its mouth had the shape
of Greek symbol delta. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/River_delta)
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the extension into two new fronts, the scope of constitutionalism would be broadened
and the content vitalized.
To better illustrate, we present a delta of constitutionalism in a geographical
metaphor, advocating that the landscape of constitutionalism has been significantly
broadened from the original course and made more vibrant today. Imagine the
formation of a river delta. The river of constitutionalism started with an original
course that focuses primarily on negative functions of constitutions. But with
transitional and transnational forces simultaneously building outwards from the
sediment of social and political experiences, the river sediment gradually deposits in a
triangular shape, forming a delta of constitutionalism as illustrated in Figure 1.
Traditional constitutionalism
Expansion
Transitional
constitutionalism
Transnational
constitutionalism
Figure 1: Delta of Constitutionalism
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2. Expansion of time and space
The metaphor of delta represents a broadened scope and a more sophisticated
formation in the recent development of constitutionalism. The formation of a river
delta entails sediment carrying substance and energy developed along the flow of
water current in both temporal and spatial senses. This corresponds finely with the
formation of a constitutional delta, with transitional force representing time dimension
while transnational expansion representing space dimension. Indeed, time and space
associated with transitional and transnational constitutionalism respectively are
precisely two dimensional expansions of modern constitutionalism.
Let us consider time dimension. As a matter of fact, the development of
transitional constitutionalism is precisely a temporal expansion of traditional
understandings. Traditional constitutionalism focuses on the moment at which a
constitution is made and expects the constitution made at this very moment to be
entrenched into future generations. In this sense, traditional constitutionalism cares no
past but look forward to the future.188 In contrast, transitional constitutionalism is
rather time-sensitive. The former regime together with its constitution is not to be
entirely abolished, but to be transformed. It is not an abruptly rupture, but a profound
change. Transitional constitutionalism has to deal with the past with cautions while
look into the future.189 Its time-sensitivity is exemplified in three aspects.
188 Time in traditional constitutionalism is both in progression and forward-looking. But a
backward-looking direction nevertheless exists when dealing with constitutional interpretations. See
generally Hans W. Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Inter-temporal Law of Statutory
Construction and Constitutional Interpretation, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 319 (1995); Lillian R. BeVier,
Moment and the Millennium: A Question of Time or Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1112 (1997);
Michael C. Dorf, Comment on Text, Time and Audience Understanding in Constitutional Law, 73
WASH. U. L. Q. 983 (1995)
189 Ruti Teitel, supra note 10, at 2068-70
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The first time-sensitivity is apparent in the issue concerning transitional
justice.190 This dilemma troubled the many new democracies in East and Central
Europe, South Africa, or Asia. To address transitional justice, one must strike a
balance between the past and the future. Stability and predictability of legal order has
to be taken into account, while substantive justice is no less important. Compromises
must be made. The ways in that past wrongdoings are redressed are not always
consistent with purely normative standards but instead mixed with practical concerns.
Punishments are present with pardons and criminal tribunals appear with truth and
reconciliation commissions.191 This time-sensitive double-edged dilemma spells out
clearly the time-sensitivity in transitional constitutionalism.
The second time-sensitivity concerns judicial decisions. As demonstrated in
some of unprecedented decisions, judicial review during transitional politics has
proved to be acutely time-sensitive than that of normal politics. For instance, faced
with an unconstitutional statute enacted in the previous regime, many constitutional
courts of transitional democracies were troubled by a similar dilemma –whether to
declare it unconstitutional and annul it right away or leave it to a newly-elected
parliament for revision? Or there may be a third option –declare it unconstitutional
but not immediately annul it, and impose a deadline for legislative compliance,
leaving the already declared unconstitutional legislation remained functioning for
some time.192 In so doing, a newly-elected parliament retains more time to work out a
new political solution, and past regime stability is balanced with current constitutional
principles. But again, how much time would be sufficient time? In Taiwan, one of the
190 Id. at 2049-51.
191 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
192 Tom Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 143-44
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most significant decisions rendered by the Constitutional Court was the Interpretation
No. 261, in that the Court ordered old members of the parliament to leave office in
one and half a year when a new election would be conducted.193 Some reacted to this
length of time as too long, while others criticized it was too short. Long or short, the
Court must dance with the time-sensitivity during such a profound transition.
Last but not least, time-sensitivity is also demonstrated in agenda settings. In the
recent experiences of democratic transitions, constitutional reforms were not always
completed in a single enactment of a new constitution. It becomes critical in
transitional politics as to which issues to go first. In this way, reform agendas became
very time-sensitive. For example, in the constitutional reform of Poland or Hungary,
what was needed at the most was perhaps the protection of property rights, freedom of
contract, or effective rule of law as the building block of a workable free market. But
in South Korea or in Taiwan, separation of powers or a new set of electoral rules was
perhaps ranked at the top of reform agenda. As a consequence, decision makers in
transitional democracies have to take cautions in prioritizing reform agenda. To obtain
a workable agenda, they must labor sufficient efforts to convince the general public to
follow their path at their time-sensitive speed.
Next we turn to spatial expansion of constitutionalism. In the recent
development, constitutions become less territory-bound as they cross over national
borders more frequently than ever before. State sovereignty and constitution would
longer match each other as transnational constitutionalism evolves. Constitution
making and adjudication is no longer at the monopoly of nation-state. In addition,
193 Tom Ginsburg, id.; Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 26. See also Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Changing Forces
of Constitutional and Regulatory Reforms in Taiwan, 4 J. CHINESE L. 83 (1990).
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constitutions have cast a great deal of influence upon non-political transnational
spheres such as trade, technology, environment, culture and the like.
In a newly expanded territory of constitutionalism, one would not be faced with
local constitutional issues only. Nor should one be focused merely on a constitution’s
“negative” functions such as constraining government powers. Today, a constitution
functions rather thoroughly in almost every aspect of modern life. Take trade issue as
an example. It used to be of little connections to constitution laws, but has now been
linked to transnational human rights concerns. Likewise, national human rights
regimes increasingly bear transnational connotations. Either a national administration
refers to customary international practice or a national court relies upon world values
or international norms. What we would expect from a constitution becomes rather
complex and expansive – including social integration, agenda setting or civil-culture
promotion, all notable constitutional functions today.
The new developments in today’s constitutionalism would in no way replace
traditional understandings. More variables in time and space, however, must be
recognized and appreciated. With the rise of a new delta in constitutionalism,
institutional choices would be more likely to be opened up for collective
decision-making. At the same time, however, constitutional outcomes would turn to
be less predictable. Nevertheless, certain conventional principles and values must
continue to be honored against contingencies in time and space. In so doing, more
room for deliberation among political parties or groups should be guaranteed and
Constitutional decision-making has to be more tackled on dialectic basis.
V. Conclusion
Conventional understanding of constitutionalism has been of limiting focus and
rights-based, holding the power of government confined by constitutional rules.
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Inspired by the dynamics of constitutional change in transitional states and
transnational networks, however, we have observed a dramtic change in the very
notion of constituinalism that have evolved for a centry or two. On the one hand,
constitutional experiences in transitional states have demonstrated a new horizon of
constitutional functions beyond limiting government powers and towards more
diversified ways of constitutional change. On the other hand, constitutions have
functioned across national borders beyond the domain of national sovereignties in an
era of globalization. These all make traditional understandings of constitutionalism
unfit, if not obsolete, in transitional or transnational context.
The developments in transitional and transnational constitutionalism would
certainly pose challenges to conventional understandings of constitutionalism. We
argue, however, that the change has been more like an expansion than a replacement.
Some of the most difficult challenges such the issues concerning accountability or
democratic deficit would be resolved gradually by creative efforts in reinventing new
solutions.
Extended from its conceptional origin with limiting government powers in focus,
the expanded constitutionalism as we propose in this article has not only broadened
the scope of constitutionalism but also presented more institutional opportunities for
colletive decisions in the era of complex global changes. As constituions expand into
more diversified forms, bear more functions, and spill over natioal borders,
constitutional lawyers must move beyond traditional ways of understanding
constitutinalism. They must instead teach themselves to be more creative in a new
territory of constitutional delta.
